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SUMMARY  TABLE 
      
  2005 2006 2007 2008 
OUTPUT 
(Real Annual Growth %) 
     
Private Consumer Expenditure 7.3 5.7 7.5 4.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 4.0 5.3 5.5 3.5 
Private Investment 11.8 3.1 1.6 -1.2 
Exports 5.2 4.4 5.4 5.1 
Imports 7.7 4.4 5.8 5.1 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 5.9 5.7 4.7 2.7 
Gross National Product (GNP) 4.9 6.5 4.4 2.9 
GNP per capita (constant prices) 2.7 3.7 1.9 1.4 
      
PRICES 
(Annual Growth %)       
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 2.5 4.0 4.9 3.4 
Wage Growth 5.6 4.9 5.5 4.5 
      
LABOUR MARKET       
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 1,952 2,039 2,089 2,101 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 89 93 105 124 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 4.4 4.4 4.8 5.6 
      
PUBLIC FINANCE       
Exchequer Balance (€m) -500 2,265 -1,393 -3,263 
General Government Balance (€m) 1,622 5,032 1,331    81 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) 1.0 2.9 0.7 0.0 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 27.3 25.2 24.4 24.9 
  
EXTERNAL TRADE       
Balance of Payments Current Account (€m) -5,692.0 -7,271 -9,464.2 -9,909.5 
Current Account (% of GNP) -4.2 -4.9 -5.9 -5.9 
  
EXCHANGE AND INTEREST RATES (end of 
year)      
US$/€ Exchange Rate 1.19 1.32 1.40 1.40 
STG£/€ Exchange Rate  0.68 0.67 0.68 0.69 
Main ECB Interest Rate  2.25 3.50 4.25 4.25 
      

  
SUMMARY 
One of the most noteworthy elements within this Commentary is the extent to which we 
have revised downwards our growth forecast for 2008, relative to our June Commentary. 
Whereas in the June Commentary, we forecast GNP growth in 2008 of 3.7 per cent, we are 
now forecasting GNP growth of 2.9 per cent. We have also revised down our growth 
forecast for 2007, although to a more modest degree; 4.4 per cent, down from the 4.8 per 
cent forecast of three months ago. 
 
The dominant factor in these downward revisions is house-building. The data that have 
emerged over the last three months that provide indications of future trends in house-
building all point to a more dramatic slowdown than we had previously anticipated. We 
now expect completions to be 78,000 in 2007 and 65,000 in 2008, compared with our June 
forecasts of 82,000 and 76,000 respectively. The effect of this faster reduction in house 
completions is to reduce our forecasts of GDP growth by 0.5 percentage points in 2007 
and by 1.3 percentage points in 2008. 
 
Apart from the decline in house-building, the other major issue overshadowing this 
Commentary is turbulence in financial markets. The impacts of the fall-out from difficulties 
in the US sub-prime lending market are being felt at the time of writing, with great 
uncertainty over who is the ultimate bearer of the risk associated with the sub-prime loans. 
While this uncertainty persists, a credit squeeze is in operation. This credit squeeze has led 
to central banks providing additional liquidity in the money markets, to the cutting of 
interest rates in the US and to particular difficulties for the UK bank, Northern Rock. 
Although we are conscious of these financial uncertainties, we do not factor them into our 
forecasts precisely because of their unknown impacts and duration. 
 
Our forecasts do take into account an anticipated slowdown in the US, with growth 
there now expected to be 1.9 per cent in 2007 and 2 per cent in 2008. For the Euro Area, 
we expect growth in 2007 to be 2.7 per cent, followed by growth of 2.3 per cent in 2008.  
 
While a fall in the rate of investment growth is central to our overall domestic growth 
forecast, we also see consumption growing at a slower pace in 2007 and 2008 relative to 
our earlier forecasts. Consumption is now expected to grow by 7.5 per cent in 2007 and by 
4 per cent in 2008. This downward revision in part reflects itself in a fall in consumer 
sentiment, as measured by the ESRI/IIB index. 
 
As a result of the general slowdown in the economy, employment growth will slow in 
2007 and 2008 relative to 2006, with rates of 2.5 per cent in 2007 and 0.6 per cent in 2008. 
For 2008, we expect the unemployment rate to average 5.6 per cent. The public finances 
will also be affected by the slowdown, with the General Government Surplus forecast to 
fall from a surplus of 2.9 per cent of GDP in 2006 to zero in 2008. 
 
One implication from our analysis is that growth in voted current expenditure in 2008 
will have to be curtailed relative to the very high growth rate of 12.9 per cent in 2007. 
Nevertheless, given the generally healthy state of the public finances, we consider that a 
mildly stimulatory budget in 2008, including the full implementation of the NDP, is 
affordable in the context of overall macroeconomic management.  
 
1 
 
FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2006 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product  
    
 2005 2006 Change in 2006 
  Forecast €m % 
 €m €m Value Volume Value Price Volume 
          
Private Consumer Expenditure 76,435 82,483 6,048 4,388 7.9 2.1 5.7 
Public Net Current Expenditure 22,870 24,939 2,069 1,204 9.0 3.6 5.3 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 42,079 46,027 3,948 1,298  9.4 6.1 3.1 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 132,098 139,766 7,669 5,870 5.8 1.3 4.4 
Physical Changes in Stocks 162 1,476 1,313 1,204    
        
Final Demand 273,645 294,691 21,046 13,965 7.7 2.5 5.1 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 112,279 120,997 8,718 4,899 7.8 3.3 4.4 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -132 -1,011 -878 -196    
        
GDP at Market Prices 161,498 174,705 13,207 9,262 8.2 2.3 5.7 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -25,775 -25,575  200 -481 -0.8 -2.6  1.9 
        
GNP at Market Prices 135,723 149,130 13,407  8,781  9.9 3.2 6.5 
          
B:  Gross National Product by Origin 
    
 2005 2006 Change in 2006 
  Forecast   
 €m €m €m % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3,397 3,195 -202 -5.9 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 65,992 72,426 6,434 9.8 
 Other: 56,270 59,649 3,379 6.0 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -538 -329   
 Statistical   
    Discrepancy -132 -1011   
     
Net Domestic Product 124,989 133,931  8,942 7.2 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -25,775 -25,575  200 -0.8 
     
National Income  99,214 108,356  9,142  9.2 
Depreciation 17,424 18,436 1,012 5.8 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 116,638 126,792 10,154 8.7 
Taxes less Subsidies 19,085 22,338 3,253 17.0 
     
GNP at Market Prices 135,723 149,130 13,407  9.9 
     
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account 
    
 2005 2006 Change in 
2006 
  Forecast  
 €m €m €m 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 19,818 18,769  -1,049 
Net Factor Payments (F) -25,775 -25,575      200 
Net Transfers 265 -465     -730 
    
Balance on Current Account -5,692 -7,271 -1,579 
as % of GNP -4.2 -4.9      -0.7 
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2007 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product  
    
 2006 2007 Change in 2007 
 Forecast Forecast €m % 
 €m €m Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expend 
Private Consumer Expenditure 82,483 91,773 9,290 6,186 11.3 3.5 7.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 24,939 27,932 2,993 1,372 12.0 6.2 5.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 46,027 47,838 1,812   719 3.9 2.3 1.6 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 139,766 148,132  8,366 7,550 6.0 0.6 5.4 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1,476 664 - 812 - 812    
        
Final Demand 294,691 316,339 21,648 15,128 7.3 2.1 5.1 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 120,997 130,546  9,549 7,030 7.9 2.0 5.8 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -1,011 -1,011 0 -42    
        
GDP at Market Prices 174,705 186,804 12,099  8,140 6.9 2.2 4.7 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -25,575 -26,550 -975 -1,517 3.8 -2.0 5.9 
        
GNP at Market Prices 149,130 160,254 11,124  6,604 7.5 2.9 4.4 
          
B:  Gross National Product by Origin  
    
 2006 2007 Change in 2007 
2006 
 Forecast Forecast   
 €m €m €m % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3,195 3,243 48 1.5 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 72,426 78,442 6,016 8.3 
 Other: 59,649 62,495 2,845 4.8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -329 -200   
 Statistical   
    Discrepancy -1,011 -1,011   
     
Net Domestic Product 133,931 142,969 9,038 6.7 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -25,575 -26,550 -975 3.8 
     
National Income 108,356 116,419 8,064 7.4 
Depreciation 18,436 19,739 1,303 7.1 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 126,792 136,159 9,366 7.4 
Taxes less Subsidies 22,338 24,096 1,758  7.9 
     
GNP at Market Prices 149,130 160,254 11,124 7.5 
     
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
    
 2006 2007 Change in 2007 
 Forecast Forecast  
 €m €m €m 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 18,769 17,586 -1,183 
Net Factor Payments (F) -25,575 -26,550 - 975 
Net Transfers -465 -500 -35 
 
   
Balance on Current Account -7,271 -9,464 -2,193 
as % of GNP -5 -6 -1.0 
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 FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2008 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
    
 2007 2008 Change in 2008 
 Preliminary Forecast €m % 
 €m €m Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 91,773 97,353 5,580 3,671 6.1 2.0 4.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 27,932 30,027 2,095 978 7.5 3.9 3.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 47,838 49,233 1,395  -593 2.9 4.2 -1.2 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 148,132 157,258  9,127 7,501 6.2 1.0 5.1 
Physical Changes in Stocks 664 531 -133 0    
        
Final Demand 316,339 334,403 18,063 11,569 5.7 2.0 3.7 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 130,546 139,446 8,900 6,637 6.8 1.6 5.1 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -1,011 -1,011 0 -38    
        
GDP at Market Prices 186,804 195,968  9,164 4,970 4.9 2.2 2.7 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -26,550 -27,222 - 672 - 403 2.5 1.0 1.5 
        
GNP at Market Prices 160,254 168,745  8,491 4,601 5.3 2.4 2.9 
          
B:  Gross National Product by Origin 
    
 2007 2008 Change in 2008 
 Preliminary Forecast   
 €m €m €m % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3,243 3,275 32 1.0 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 78,442 82,522 4,079 5.2 
 Other: 62,495 65,372 2,877 4.6 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -200 -200  
 Statistical   
    Discrepancy -1,011 -1,011  
     
Net Domestic Product 142,969 149,958 6,989 4.9 
less:    
Net Factor Payments -26,550 -27,222 -672 2.5 
    
National Income 116,419 122,736 6,317 5.4 
Depreciation 19,739 20,767 1,027 5.2 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 136,159 143,503 7,344 5.4 
Taxes less Subsidies 24,096 25,243 1,147 4.8 
    
GNP at Market Prices 160,254 168,745  8,491 5.3 
     
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
    
 2007 2008 Change in 2008
  Forecast  
 €m €m €m 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 17,586 17,813 227 
Net Factor Payments (F) -26,550 -27,222   -672 
Net Transfers -500 -500 0 
    
Balance on Current Account -9,464 -9,910 -445 
as % of GNP -5.9 -5.9  0.0 
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 THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY 
The main developments of note are as follows: 
 
• At the time of writing, the international context is 
characterised by uncertainty on international financial 
markets as the fall-out from the US sub-prime crisis 
unfolds. 
• Growth in the Euro Area is expected to remain robust in 
2007 and 2008, with real GDP increasing by 2.7 and 2.3 per 
cent respectively. The international financial turmoil has 
made the interest rate outlook more uncertain. On the one 
hand, a tightening labour market and rising commodity 
prices raise the potential for one further 25 basis points 
interest rate increase by the ECB in 2007. However, risks to 
price stability may soften as the Euro strengthens and 
global demand for oil may not grow as strongly in 2008 
than previously anticipated. More importantly, the effects 
on the real economy of the continuing credit market 
turbulence may also warrant a loosening of monetary 
policy. For the purposes of our forecasts, we have chosen 
to use a technical assumption that one further interest rate 
rise of 25 basis points will be made in December. 
• Growth prospects for the US economy are weaker than 
previously expected at 1.9 per cent in 2007 and 2 per cent 
in 2008 due to our anticipation of much lower 
consumption growth as the housing market contraction 
combined with the fallout from the sub-prime mortgage 
market takes its toll. The US dollar has reached an all-time 
low against the Euro, and was trading in the $1.40 range at 
time of writing.  
• The UK economy is expected to grow by 2.9 per cent this 
year and by 2.2 per cent in 2008. 
Box: Euroframe-European Forecasting Network 
The forecasts for the international section are based on the Autumn 
Report of Euroframe-European Forecasting Network, 2007. The 
Euroframe-EFN is made up of ten institutes from across Europe 
who collectively produce independent forecasts for the European 
Commission twice yearly. The countries represented in the network 
are Germany (2 institutes), France, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, 
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Austria, Poland, the UK and Ireland (with Ireland being represented 
by the ESRI). http://www.euroframe.org 
 
 The Euro Area contributed to more balanced global growth with 
a strong performance in 2006, expanding at 2.9 per cent. This pace 
of growth has been maintained for the most part in 2007, with real 
GDP growth of 2.7 per cent expected this year and 2.3 per cent in 
2008. 
Euro Area 
 
The impressive recovery of the Euro Area economy in the 
recent past has been driven by strong export and investment 
growth, particularly in Germany where real GDP growth of 3.1 per 
cent was registered in 2006. According to the Euroframe-European 
Forecasting Network (EFN), growth in the Euro Area’s largest 
economy is expected to remain healthy although moderating in 
2007 and 2008 with rates of 2.7 and 2.2 per cent expected 
respectively. The continuing buoyancy of the German economy is 
reflected in the anticipated labour market developments, as 
unemployment in Germany is expected to fall to 6.1 per cent in 
2008. With the tightening of the labour market, earnings growth is 
expected to increase in 2007 and 2008 contributing to inflation of 2 
per cent and 1.8 per cent in each year respectively.  
 
The French economy continues to grow at a slower pace than 
that of Germany, with real GDP growth of 2.2 per cent in 2006. 
The EFN forecasts a fall in real GDP growth this year to 1.9 per 
cent, rebounding to 2.3  per cent in 2008. The slowdown this year is  
driven by disappointing export  and investment growth.  As a result 
of proposed tax cuts and a fall in unemployment to 7.8 per cent, 
consumer spending is expected to increase robustly in 2008 which 
leads to the higher forecast for real GDP growth next year.  
 
Italy saw real GDP growth of 1.9 per cent in 2006, its strongest 
performance for a number of years. While export growth was key to 
the 2006 result, domestic demand is expected to dominate growth 
prospects this year. The EFN anticipates real GDP growth of 1.8 
per cent in 2007, while unemployment is forecast to be 6 per cent, 
down from 6.8 per cent in 2006. However, a full blown recovery is 
yet to take hold in Italy, as real GDP growth is expected to fall in 
2008 to just 1.5 per cent as increases in personal consumption 
moderate and import growth outstrips that of exports.  
 
The outlook for the Euro Area economy as a whole remains 
positive, with some potential downside risks emerging as the effects 
of the ongoing re-pricing of risk in financial markets on the real 
economy become apparent. In 2007 continued strong investment 
and export performance (4.8 and 5.7 per cent growth respectively), 
alongside increases in government expenditure in many member 
states, are expected to be the primary contributors to economic 
growth. Unemployment fell to 6.9 per cent in June of this year, the 
 
 lowest it has ever been since the Euro was adopted, and maintained 
that level in July. The EFN expects the unemployment rate to 
average 7 per cent in 2007 and to fall further to 6.5 per cent in 2008. 
As the labour market tightens, wage demands are likely to increase 
leading to the forecast for earnings growth of 2.8 per cent in 2007 
and 3.3 per cent in 2008.  
 
Increases in wage demands present upside risks to inflation in 
the medium term, and according to the ECB remain a key factor 
influencing its thoughts on monetary policy. Year on year wage 
growth in Q2 was 2.5 per cent according to Eurostat. Other upside 
risks include the price of commodities and food, although the 
projected slowdown in the US and possible moves to increase 
production by OPEC might lead to the price of oil remaining at a 
level consistent with price stability. The EFN assumes oil prices will 
increase by 5 per cent per barrel in 2007 and 6.5 per cent in 2008, 
down from an increase of 22.4 per cent in 2006. The pace of 
growth in the broad money supply (M3) has been increasing 
throughout 2007, up to 11.7 per cent in July on an annual basis, 
presenting further upside risks to the inflation outlook. Inflation as 
measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) 
was estimated at 1.8 per cent in August, in line with the ECB target 
of being close to but below 2 per cent. Nonetheless, the bank still 
regards its monetary stance as “accommodative”. Core inflation, 
which excludes volatile energy and food prices and is more relevant 
to underlying price pressures, was 2 per cent in August.  
 
After clearly indicating that a further rise was imminent in 
August, the recent turmoil in financial markets led the ECB to keep 
its main refinancing rate at 4 per cent following the latest meeting 
of its Governing Council in September. Many European banks have 
been affected by the crisis in international credit markets, and the 
ECB has been the most proactive central bank in terms of 
providing liquidity in attempts to ease the strain on the financial 
system. However, it is still unclear as to the extent to which the 
crisis stemming from the US sub-prime mortgage market will affect 
both the monetary and real sides of the Euro Area economy. The 
direct exposure of financial institutions to sub-prime mortgage 
backed securities is becoming more evident as their portfolios are 
marked to market and an appropriate price for bearing these risky 
securities is found. However, in the absence of a definitive market 
price for this risk and an understanding of their own and others 
direct exposure, banks have been reluctant to lend to each other. 
This has led to inter-bank borrowing rates being well above the 
ECB main policy rate as the markets have been characterised by a 
damaging lack of trust. In such an environment it is possible that 
contagion in the financial markets can affect institutions that will 
ultimately be shown not to have direct exposure to the US sub-
prime mortgage market as well as those who have. It may also affect 
the real economy through a number of channels: banks may not 
have sufficient credit to forward to non-financial entities leading to 
7 
 retail interest rates increasing and dampening business investment 
and personal consumption; there may be a further consumption 
shock as the net worth of individuals’ portfolios declines; 
confidence levels of both consumers and businesses could suffer, 
further depressing economic activity. Therefore, the ECB’s actions 
in providing liquidity have assisted the financial system to avoid 
seizing up completely and the “wait and see” approach on interest 
rates is warranted as data become available on the effects felt by the 
real economy. 
 
In spite of the turmoil, there remains a possibility that the ECB 
will raise interest rates by a further 25 basis points before the end of 
2007. Our forecasts are based on the technical assumption of one 
further interest rate increase in December of this year, bringing the 
ECB main refinancing rate to 4.25 per cent and remaining at that 
level through 2008. The EFN expects Euro Area inflation of 1.9 per 
cent in 2007 and 2.1 per cent in 2008. However, the increase in 
inter-bank lending rates faced by banks has caused their spreads to 
narrow and may lead to retail interest rate increases in the short 
term. 
Figure 1: Interest Rates 
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*Mortgage rate taken is the Irish Representative Building Societies Mortgage Rate. 
Source: Central Statistics Office. 
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not be needed in the coming months, as headline inflation fell 
 The robust pace of real GDP growth in 2006 of 2.8 per cent has 
continued into 2007, with the EFN forecasting growth for the year 
of 2.9 per cent, falling to 2.2 per cent in 2008. The Bank of 
England’s (BoE) inflationary outlook in early August was 
cautionary, signalling that domestic consumption, external demand 
and particularly energy and non-wage labour costs may not evolve 
in the short to medium term in a manner consistent with the Bank’s 
target of keeping inflation close to 2 per cent. However, more 
recent data suggest that further tightening of monetary policy would 
United 
Kingdom 
 
 sharply to 1.9 per cent in July and earnings growth of 3.4 per cent in 
Q2, was at its lowest in six years. Combined with the recent turmoil 
in financial markets, which saw sterling inter-bank lending rates 
higher than at any time since 1998, these trends indicate that it is 
increasingly unlikely that the BoE will increase rates further this 
year following their latest decision to hold its Bank rate at 5.75 per 
cent. Some upside risks to inflation still exist. However, the forecast 
decline in domestic and external consumption growth suggest that 
these risks are less significant than previously thought.  
The BoE has come under criticism over its handling of the 
liqu
grew by 2.9 per cent in 2006 in the US. This was 
Figu xchange Rates 
ource: Central Bank & Financial Services Authority of Ireland (historic) and 
United States 
idity problems faced by British banks recently, especially in the 
light of developments at Northern Rock. It would appear that the 
recent intervention in the three-month money market by the BoE 
has been forced upon it following its prior reluctance to actively 
seek to reduce the spread between the inter-bank lending rates and 
its own policy rate. 
 
 Real GDP 
slightly lower than previous years and much lower than initial 
estimates, due to a sharper than expected downturn in housing 
investment towards the end of the year. The housing market has 
remained the main causal factor in the development of the US 
economy through 2007. Housing investment has contracted sharply 
in 2007, in conjunction with both house price growth and housing 
demand softening. The EFN expects housing investment to fall by 
14.6 per cent this year, leading to real GDP growth of just 1.9 per 
cent. 
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 Opinion on the fallout from the slowing US housing market had 
been somewhat positive in the first half of 2007. It was believed 
that the slowdown in the housing market would not have a major 
impact on consumption levels as employment growth remained 
healthy. However, this benign outlook is increasingly difficult to 
maintain as the year progresses. Declining house prices have 
provided less incentive for homeowners to refinance their 
mortgages to support increased consumption.1 Compounding the 
problem is the crisis in credit markets stemming from the US sub-
prime mortgage market. As defaults by sub-prime borrowers began 
to increase and the exposure of mortgage lenders and financial 
institutions who invested in securitised sub-prime instruments 
became apparent, an ongoing chain of events in credit markets 
began which has seen inter-bank lending rates increase and banks 
hoarding liquidity to meet their own short-term financing needs. If 
this trend continues less credit will be available to fuel household 
consumption as retail interest rates increase. As a consequence 
household saving would be expected to rise. According to the EFN, 
consumption growth is expected to fall to 2.6 per cent in 2007 and 
1.1 per cent in 2008 as a result of this double blow of falling house 
prices and less credit availability. A general lack of consumer 
confidence may set in as employment growth prospects begin to 
soften; employment growth was weaker than expected during the 
summer and the number of jobless claims increased for the first 
time in four years during August. The anticipated weakening of the 
US dollar along with earnings growth falling next year to 2.6 per 
cent is expected to be reflected in import growth of just 1.6 and 1.1 
per cent in 2007 and 2008 respectively. 
 
Unemployment is forecast to increase from 4.6 per cent in 2007 
to 5 per cent in 2008. Sustained export growth above 6 per cent 
alongside an increase in government expenditure are expected to be 
the main contributors to real GDP growth in 2008 of 2. per cent. 
Retail price inflation is anticipated to average 2.3 per cent in 2007 
and fall to just 0.8 per cent in 2008. The effect of the slowdown in 
housing investment on growth, now accompanied by the effects of 
the credit squeeze on the real economy, indicates that the Federal 
Reserve is likely to loosen its monetary policy stance in the coming 
months as inflationary pressures ease significantly. Interest rates are 
likely to fall further following the recent decision to cut the Federal 
funds rate by 50 basis points to 4.75 per cent. 
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1 Mortgage equity withdrawal appears to have been a major factor in US household 
consumption in the light of house price inflation more than doubling the value of 
owner occupied housing since the start of the decade. 40 per cent of existing 
mortgages were refinanced in 2005 (Feldstein, M. in “Housing, Housing Finance 
and Monetary Policy: Proceedings from the 2007 Jackson Hole Symposium of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City”, www.kc.frb.org). 
 
 Table 1:  Short-term International Outlook  
      
 GDP Output Growth Consumer Price Average Earnings Growth Unemployment Rate Current Account Balance 
 Inflation % % of GDP 
    
Country 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
                
UK 2.8 2.9 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.0 4.7 4.0 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.6 -3.7 -4.5 -5.6 
Germany 3.1 2.7 2.2 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.3 2.4 3.0 8.4 6.7 6.1 5.0 5.2 5.2 
France 2.2 1.9 2.3 1.9 1.4 1.8 3.4 2.8 2.8 9.0 8.1 7.9 -1.3 -1.0 -1.8 
Italy 1.9 1.8 1.5 2.2 1.9 2.2 2.9 2.0 3.0 6.8 6.1 6.0 -2.6 -2.9 -3.2 
                
Euro Area 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.9 2.8 3.3 7.9 7.0 6.5 -0.2 -0.5 -0.6 
USA 2.9 1.9 2.0 3.0 2.3 0.8 4.1 4.5 2.6 4.6 4.6 5.0 -6.2 -5.9 -5.5 
Japan 2.2 2.0 1.7  0.9  1.2 1.3 -0.4 -0.1 2.4 4.1 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.3 4.3 
China 10.7 10.9  9.8 1.4 2.3 2.8       9.5   
                
Ireland 5.7 4.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.5 4.9 5.5 4.5 4.4 4.8 5.6 -4.2 -5.1 -5.1 
                
Source: Euroframe-EFN Autumn 2007. 
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 The Japanese economy experienced real GDP growth of 2.2 per 
cent in 2006, with external demand being the key factor. However, 
despite the tightening labour market, with unemployment falling to 
4.1 per cent last year, earnings and price inflation have not taken 
hold and consumption growth remains depressed. Low 
consumption and investment growth implies real GDP growth 
slowing to 2 per cent this year. Unemployment is expected to fall in 
2007 to 3.8 per cent, a level it should maintain in 2008. However, it 
is not foreseen that the continued export led growth will result in 
domestic consumption increasing significantly. Export growth is 
expected to slow in 2008 as a result of the forecast slowdown in the 
US, which in the absence of domestic demand picking up leads to 
the projected 2008 real GDP growth rate of 1.7 per cent. Given the 
absence of significant price inflation, poor growth prospects and 
the ongoing financial market turmoil, it is unlikely the Bank of 
Japan will raise interest rates in the coming months. The 
governments finances appear to be improving, with the fiscal deficit 
expected to be just 2.4 per cent of GDP in 2007 and the 
government debt which had ballooned in recent years to 177 per 
cent of GDP is expected to stabilise. 
Asia 
China continues to grow strongly, with real GDP growth of 10.9 
per cent expected in 2007 following 10.7 per cent growth in 2006. 
The Chinese economy is expected to expand by 9.8 per cent in 
2008, as growth prospects in its main export markets begin to 
moderate. Meanwhile inflationary pressures domestically are causing 
concern for policy makers. Food prices are increasing sharply due 
to rising animal feed costs and a shortage of meat as a result of a 
large fall in pork production. The People’s Bank of China is likely to 
raise interest rates further in the coming months to combat 
inflation, which has traditionally been a source of popular unrest, 
and negative real interest rates, which are providing an incentive for 
people to invest in an already overheating stock market. 
 
 According to the EFN the global economy grew by 5.4 per cent 
in 2006. This strong performance has continued into 2007, although 
moderating as the year progresses. The EFN expect global 
economic growth of 5.1 per cent in 2007 and 4.8 per cent in 2008. 
Much of this slowdown is related to the moderation of growth 
prospects in the US and Japan, despite the good performance of 
emerging economies. World trade is expected to grow by 7 per cent 
in 2007 and 7.3 per cent in 2008 after increasing by an estimated 8.4 
per cent in 2006. 
International 
Context for 
Ireland 
 
Ireland faces a more uncertain international setting than in our 
previous Commentary. The effects of the recent turmoil in financial 
markets on the global real economy are yet to be fully ascertained. 
Global growth was more balanced in 2006, with less of a direct 
reliance on the US. However, consumer spending in the US has 
undoubtedly supported global growth in recent years, and has 
contributed to many emerging economies enjoying export driven 
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 booms, particularly China. In conjunction with this, large current 
account and trade imbalances have arisen and the US dollar has 
arguably been kept stronger than its fundamentals warranted by 
large capital inflows from the rest of the world, further stimulating 
US consumer demand. The magnitude of this situation looks less 
likely to be maintained in the current climate. As interest rate cuts 
are anticipated to be greater in the US than elsewhere, the US dollar 
is likely to weaken further vis-à-vis the Euro, following its decline to 
$1.40 at the time of writing from $1.32 at the end of 2006. 
However, given the expected continued growth of the Euro Area, 
the UK and other emerging markets the international context at the 
time of writing remains favourable for Ireland, with the potential 
for downside risks emerging as the sub-prime fallout continues. 
 
The most direct impact from the US sub-prime fallout on the 
Irish economy could be through interest rates. The ECB may yet 
decide that monetary policy is already sufficiently tight as data 
emerges towards the end of the year on how the Euro Area 
economy is performing in the light of developments in the credit 
market. Our forecasts are based on the technical assumption that 
one further interest rate increase of 25 basis points will happen in 
December. However, the prospects of further interest rate cuts in 
the US, a strengthening Euro, and potentially slower demand 
growth for commodities, such as oil, may imply that price pressures 
would ease such that interest rates may not need to be increased. 
The risk remains, however, that retail interest rates for Irish 
consumers will increase due to the increased inter-bank lending 
rates faced by Irish banks (as opposed to increases in the ECB 
refinancing rate). 
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 THE DOMESTIC 
ECONOMY 
 The CSO released the National Income and Expenditure for 2006 in 
July 2007. It contained a number of significant changes from the 
preliminary quarterly accounts for 2006 Q4 released in March 2007. 
The headline GNP growth rate is now almost one percentage point 
lower than initially estimated (6.5 per cent compared to 7.4 per 
cent), while the deficit on the current account of the Balance of 
Payments has been revised upwards from 3.8 per cent of GNP to 
4.9 per cent of GNP. These revisions have also reduced the 
estimated level of personal savings over a number of years. The 
consequence of these revisions is that our forecast balance of 
payments deficit for 2007 and 2008 is now much wider than in the 
June QEC, and correspondingly our forecast savings rate is  much 
lower. These changes to our forecast are largely knock-on effects, 
driven by these revisions. 
General 
 
However, our forecasts for 2007 and 2008 do include a number 
of important substantive changes relative to our June estimates. 
Despite strong first quarter results as reported in the latest Quarterly 
National Accounts our overall growth forecast is lower. This is largely 
driven by a much lower forecast for investment, given the latest 
indicators which suggest that the rate of house completions in 2007 
and 2008 is likely to fall sharply. We also expect a slower pace of 
consumption growth in 2007 relative to our June estimates, 
although at 7.5 per cent in 2007 this is still a very strong rate of 
growth due in part to the release of SSIA funds. For 2008 our  
GNP growth forecast of just under 3 per cent is a significant 
downward revision and implies a fall in GNP growth to a rate last 
seen in 2002. This in turn has consequences in the labour market 
with the unemployment rate expected to rise to 5.6 per cent and the 
pace of net inward migration expected to slow significantly. 
 
With slower employment growth and a decline in the housing 
market, the pace of exchequer tax revenue growth is expected to 
slow significantly in 2007 and 2008. In our estimates this would all 
but wipe out the General Government surplus of €5 billion 
recorded at the end of 2006.  
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  In 2006, consumption grew by 5.7 per cent in volume terms, 
thereby registering a faster pace of growth than the other 
components of demand. As can be seen from Figure 3, this 5.7 per 
cent hides a slowdown in growth in consumption through the 
course of the year, and into 2007. In spite of the slowdown, the rate 
of growth in consumption was still strong in the first quarter of 
2007, at 5.4 per cent.  
Consumption 
 
The latest data from the retail sales index (again as shown in 
Figure 3) show continued growth, and indeed accelerated growth. 
On an annual average2 basis, the index grew by 6.8 per cent in June 
of this year. This pick-up is likely to be related to the maturing of 
the SSIAs. Excluding motor vehicles, the rate of growth in the 
index was 7 per cent, with sales of all vehicles cars growing by 6.5 
per cent. Sales of new cars registered an annual increase of 9.3 per 
cent in June. Trips abroad grew by 13.2 per cent in the first quarter 
of 2007, thereby providing another indicator of strong spending 
growth. 
Figure 3: Annual Growth Rates in Personal Consumption and Retail 
Sales 
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Source: Quarterly National Accounts & Retail Sales Index, Central Statistics Office. 
 
Looking ahead, our forecast for the volume of consumption 
growth in 2007 is 7.5 per cent. This amounts to an acceleration on 
the 2006 figure of 5.7 per cent and is mostly explained by the 
anticipated effect of the SSIAs. We should note, however, that our 
forecast for consumption growth in 2007 is now 0.3 percentage 
points lower than in our last Commentary. The reason for this change 
is a lowering in consumer confidence, as measured by the ESRI/IIB 
Consumer Sentiment Index. It appears that the slowing in the economy 
 
2 Unless otherwise stated annual growth rates refer to the latest twelve months or 
four quarters relative to a year previously. 
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 is impacting upon consumer perceptions and that a more 
conservative approach to SSIAs may be taken.  
 
For 2008, our forecast is for consumption growth of 4 per cent. 
This is down relative to our forecast for 2007, as a result of the 
absence of SSIA-related spending. However, it is also down 0.5 
percentage points on our forecast in the last Commentary. Our 
forecasts for both slower employment and slower wage growth 
suggested that consumption growth would also be lower in 2008, 
relative to our earlier expectations. 
 
 According to the NIE 2006 estimates investment grew by 3.1 per 
cent in volume terms last year, with prices increasing by 6.1 per 
cent. This marks a very significant deceleration in the pace of 
investment growth in recent years, the lowest growth rate since 
2002. This was driven in part by a fall in investment in machinery 
and equipment, of 5.1 per cent in volume terms. In addition, the 
growth in the volume of housing investment, at 3.5 per cent, is the 
lowest increase since 1994. Given that investment in housing in 
2006 accounted for half of all investment in the economy this has 
also contributed to the marked deceleration in overall investment 
growth in 2006. Offsetting this was a significant acceleration in the 
pace of growth in non-housing building and construction, which 
grew in volume terms by 9.5 per cent in 2006. 
Investment 
 
In the first six months of 2007 house completions stagnated.  In 
the twelve months ending June 2007 total annual house 
completions were approximately 88,500, virtually unchanged from 
the 2006 figure (see Figure 4). However, data for July indicate that 
total completions were down almost 2,800 units compared to July 
2006. Furthermore data on planning permissions, housing 
commencements and new house registrations, all of which are 
forward indicators of future house completions, point to a 
significant slowdown in house completions over the next eighteen 
months. Planning permissions for houses and apartments for the 
year ended 2007Q1 were almost 77,000, down from a peak of over 
104,000 in 2005Q2, house commencements were just over 67,000 
in the year ended 2007Q2 compared to a peak of almost 79,000 in 
2006Q2, and new house registrations were just over 54,000 in the 
year ended 2007Q2 compared with a peak of almost 69,000 in the 
year ended 2006Q3. Using simple rule of thumb projections3 based 
on these recent trends we have revised downwards our forecast for 
house completions for 2007 to 78,000 and for 2008 to 65,000. 
 
3 Projections were carried out using registrations and commencements data 
assuming a 12-15 month lag. This gives a range of estimates of house completions 
for 2007 of between 75,000 and 80,000 and for 2008 of between 54,000 and 
67,000. 
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Figure 4: Housing Statistics4
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Source: Dept. of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government. 
 
In terms of house prices, the most recent data from the 
permanent tsb/ESRI house price index point to a slow but steady 
decline in house prices since the beginning of 2007. Data for July 
suggest that prices nationally have fallen by 3 per cent relative to 
December 2006, while prices for new houses have fallen by 1.6 per 
cent over the same period. We expect this trend to continue and 
have projected an annual average fall of 3 per cent in new house 
prices in 2007. It is important to point out that as an annual average 
figure, this implies quite a significant year-on-year drop in prices. 
Depending on how prices behave in individual months in the 
autumn, this could lead to a fall of over 15 per cent in prices by 
December 2007 relative to December 2006. For 2008 we expect no 
change in the annual average price, again implying a gradual 
recovery in new house prices in the early part of 2008. 
 
 
 
4 The completions figure for 2005 is adjusted upwards to include an estimated 5000 
extra completions, Q1 and Q2 2006 reduced by 2000 and 3000 respectively as per 
DEHLG estimates. 
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Table 2: Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
 
  
        
 2005 % Change in 2006 2006 % Change in 2007 2007 % Change in 2008 2008 
 €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
Housing 20,975 3.5 10.7 23,221 -8.9 -10.2 20,853 -14.0 -12.7 18,207 
           
Other Building 11,201  9.5 18.0 13,216 12.0 20.4 15,913 10.0 18.3 18,817 
           
Building and 
Construction 32,176 5.6 13.2 36,438 -1.3 0.9 36,766 -4.1 0.7 37,023 
           
Machinery and 
Equipment  9,903 -5.1 -3.2  9,589 12.0 15.5 11,073 8.0 10.3 12,210 
           
Total 42,079 3.1  9.4 46,027 1.6 3.9 47,838 -1.2 2.9 49,233 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Box: The Importance of the Projected House Completions Figures 
for the Overall Growth Rate 
In 2006 housing accounted for almost 16 per cent of total GNP. 
Because of this our downward revisions in house completions have 
significant implications for our overall growth forecast. In the June 
QEC we had forecast house completions for 2007 at 82,000 and 
76,000 in 2008, cutting this back to 78,000 and 65,000 respectively 
knocks 0.5 percentage points from our GDP forecast for 2007 and 
1.3 percentage points for 2008.  
Nevertheless, we would argue that these revisions, especially for 
2008, may well turn out to be overly optimistic. Data from the 2006 
Census indicate that between the period 2002-2006 the total 
number of households increased by 182,000 while an additional 
320,000 houses were built. Even allowing for some obsolescence of 
the existing housing stock, these figures point to a 40 per cent rate 
of vacancy for new houses built in this period. In the Spring 2007 
QEC we argued that this very rapid growth in the demand for 
second dwellings may explain our estimate that house prices in 2006 
were 15 per cent overvalued.5 Factoring in our forecast decline in 
house prices in 2007 and 2008, together with a lower rate of house 
completions, means that this over-valuation falls to under 10 per 
cent by 2008. As discussed above, there is a great deal of 
uncertainty in world financial markets, and this could well lead to a 
more significant fall in the demand for second homes than that 
implied in our forecasts. Were this to happen, then our estimates 
suggest that house prices could fall further in 2008. 
 
We expect to see a 17 per cent increase in investment in home 
improvements in 2007, buoyed by SSIA funds, so that the overall 
deflator for housing investment is expected to fall by 1.5 per cent in 
2007 and increase by 1.5 per cent in 2008. This is based on an 
assumed increase in the price of home improvements of 7 per cent 
in 2007 and 6 per cent in 2008. In volume terms overall housing 
investment is expected to fall by 8.9 per cent in 2007 and to fall by 
14 per cent in 2008. 
 
Recent data from the Quarterly National Accounts point to a pick-
up in investment activity in the first quarter of 2007, and this is 
reflected in our forecast numbers for investment in machinery and 
equipment and non-housing building and construction for 2007. 
We have increased our forecast for volume growth in investment in 
other building and construction in 2007 from 10 per cent to 12 per 
cent. This is driven in part by the current rapid roll-out of capital 
spending under the National Development Plan (NDP). We 
estimate that the NDP will add €1.4 billion to total investment in 
 
5 This estimate is based on an equation for housing demand where new house 
prices are determined by personal disposable income, house building, population 
and real interest rates, see Duffy, D., J. Fitz Gerald and I. Kearney, 2005. “Rising 
House Prices in an Open Labour Market”, The Economic and Social Review, Winter, 
pp. 251-272. 
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 2007 and €1.6 billion in 2008, equivalent to over half of the total 
increase in other building and construction investment. In addition 
we expect continued strong growth in commercial building and 
construction. The latest indicators on planning permissions for non-
residential building suggest a strong acceleration in the pace of this 
investment.  
 
Despite these very strong growth rates in non-residential 
building and construction investment, the relative importance of 
housing in total building and construction means that combining 
these growth rates with a fall of 8.9 per cent in the volume of 
housing investment in 2007 and 14 per cent in 2008 leads to an 
overall fall in the volume of total building and construction 
investment of 1.3 per cent in 2007 and 4.1 per cent in 2008.  
 
Box: Growth in Private Sector Credit 
The Commentary forecasting model does not have an integrated 
monetary section. As mentioned in the Balance of Payments 
section, the sheer scale of financial investment flows in both 
directions through the current account of the balance of payments, 
a large part of which are related to IFSC activity, make it difficult to 
disentangle those which have a lasting real effect on the Irish 
economy in terms of output and employment. A more tangible 
indicator of financial activity are the Central Bank monthly data on 
private sector credit growth. Figure A shows the scale of growth in 
private sector credit in Ireland since 2003 when it rose from roughly 
110 per cent of GDP to over 180 per cent at the beginning of 2007.  
Figure A: Developments in Private Sector Credit 
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 Well over half of this stock of credit is directly linked to the 
housing market: in June 2007, some 41 per cent of total private 
sector credit was to the personal sector (34 per cent directly related 
to housing finance), while a further 21 per cent was in real estate 
activities. This is excluding credit to the construction sector, at over 
20 
 7 per cent of the total, much of which is also be property related. 
And the latest credit figures suggest that three-quarters of the 
increase in credit in the year to June 2007 was property-related.       
  It can also be seen from Figure A that growth in private sector 
credit has begun to slow since the end of 2005, although still at 
double-digit rates and well above the low growth rates recorded in 
the 2002-2003 period. Given the current turbulence in financial 
markets it remains to be seen how domestic credit growth will 
develop in the next few months. 
 
The value of investment in machinery and equipment fell by an 
estimated 3.2 per cent in 2006. A large part of this was due to a fall 
of 44 per cent in the purchase of aircraft in 2006 following large 
purchases in 2005. Excluding the impact of aircraft purchases, 
investment in machinery and equipment grew by 5.4 per cent in 
value terms. The timing of planned aircraft purchases remains 
uncertain; based on current published figures we estimate that they 
could account for over 10 per cent of total investment in machinery 
and equipment in 2007. Accordingly, we forecast strong growth of 
15.5 per cent in the value of machinery and equipment investment 
in 2007, with volume growth of 12 per cent, this figure also implies 
strong growth of non-aircraft investments. However, there is a great 
deal of uncertainty attaching to this forecast. For 2008, we forecast 
volume growth of 8 per cent and value growth of 10.3 per cent. 
 
These forecasts imply an overall growth in volume investment 
of 1.6 per cent in 2007 and a fall of 1.2 per cent in 2008. These are 
very low growth rates relative to recent years and, if realised, will 
imply that the rapid rise in the share of investment in GNP of 
recent years, peaking at 30 per cent of GNP in 2005, will fall to just 
over 29 per cent by 2008 (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Investment as a Share of GNP 
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 The August Exchequer returns indicate that the exchequer 
balance deteriorated by just over €3 billion in the twelve months 
since August 2006. This deterioration is driven by both a significant 
slowing in the pace of growth in tax revenues, and an acceleration 
in the pace of voted expenditure growth.  In the seven months to 
August 2007 tax revenue grew by 5.8 per cent as compared with 
12.7 per cent in 2006. Voted expenditure grew by 19.8 per cent over 
the same period as compared with 10.8 per cent in 2006. 
Government 
Spending and 
Public 
Finances 
 
Looking at tax revenues first, both corporation tax revenues and 
stamp duties have fallen below the amount collected in the first 
seven months of 2006. Changes in payment scheduling for 
corporation tax to a current year payment basis, which have been 
phased in over the past five years, have generated cash-flow gains in 
each of these years. It is anticipated that the end of this transition 
phase will lead to a once-off fall in the corporation tax yield in 2007. 
In this context it would be premature to suggest that this fall 
reflects any real economy effects, indeed the August 2007 figure is 
almost 7 per cent above the official monthly profile. For stamp 
duties, the fall of over 2 per cent relative to the same period last 
year is far below the official profile of an increase of 9 per cent and 
undoubtedly reflects the current slowdown in the housing market. 
Aggregating across all capital taxes (stamp duties, capital gains tax, 
capital acquisitions tax), their growth rate slowed from 46.5 per cent 
in the seven months to August 2006 to 4.1 per cent in the seven 
months to August 2007. Across the other main tax heads, customs, 
excise duties and VAT are below profile and the equivalent growth 
rate in 2006. All of these data are suggestive of an economy that has 
slowed rapidly within a twelve-month period. The exception in the 
monthly returns is income taxes which have been growing strongly 
and above profile, however, this is partly buoyed by the inflow of 
SSIA exit tax funds. This slowdown, especially in the housing 
market, has had a significant impact on our own tax forecasts for 
2007 and 2008. We now expect tax revenue to grow by just 5.9 per 
cent in 2007, slowing to 4.2 per cent in 2008. These are similar to 
the growth rates seen in the period 2001-2002.  
 
In terms of voted expenditure growth, it is important to 
distinguish between current and capital expenditures. Budget 2007 
planned for an increase of 13.5 per cent in total voted expenditure, 
12.9 per cent in current expenditure and 16.2 per cent in capital 
expenditure. The present overshoot relative to planned 
expenditures is entirely confined to capital expenditures. On this 
basis we are assuming that total voted expenditures will come in on 
target for the full year 2007. Our forecast for 2008 is more 
complicated. We have increased the growth in current voted 
expenditure to 8 per cent (an increase of €120 million above 
budget). This figure assumes full indexation of all transfers and 
public sector wages but no discretionary change in policy. 
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 Our estimates for 2007 suggest that the General Government 
Surplus (GGS) will narrow from €5 billion to €1.3 billion, 
equivalent to a reduction of 2.5 percentage points of GNP. While 
the rapid slowdown in the housing market, and related tax revenues, 
have in part driven this deterioration in the public finances, it has 
also been driven by the very expansionary nature of Budget 2007. 
The acceleration in planned expenditure in 2007 and beyond that is 
related to NDP capital expenditure and is broadly to be welcomed. 
However, the pace of growth in planned voted current expenditure 
in 2007, at 12.9 per cent, following on rapid growth in 2006 at 11.2 
per cent, means that fiscal policy has been unnecessarily stimulatory 
in those years.  
 
For 2008 our estimates suggest that to achieve a neutral fiscal 
stance voted current expenditure will have to increase by 8 per cent. 
Assuming capital expenditure meets its target – with full 
implementation of planned NDP expenditure – and given our 
forecast tax revenues this implies a GGS for 2008 of €81 million. 
Under this scenario the government surplus of  €5 billion would be 
eliminated within a two-year period. In the context of very rapid 
slowdown in economic growth, we consider that such an outcome 
should not be a cause for concern; indeed our analysis suggests that 
the public finances would allow for a mildly stimulatory budget in 
2008, in addition to full implementation of the NDP. 
Table 3: Public Finances 
      
 2006 % Change 2007 % Change 2008 
      
Current Revenue 46,145 5.7 48,793 4.2 50,846 
Current Expenditure 36,994 12.4 41,590 7.1 44,547 
  of which: Voted 32,915 12.9 37,165 8.0 40,141 
      
Current Surplus 9,151 -21.3 7,203 -12.6 6,299 
      
Capital Receipts 1,871  -20.7 1,483 -0.4 1,477 
Capital Expenditure 8,758 15.1 10,080  9.5 11,039 
  of which: Voted 6,476 16.2 7,528 11.3 8,381 
      
Capital Borrowing -6,886 24.8 -8,597 11.2 -9,562 
      
Exchequer Balance 2,265   -1,393  -3,263 
 as % of GNP 1.5  -0.9  -1.9 
       
General Gove ment Balance rn 5,032  1,331  81 
 as % of GDP 2.9  0.7  0.0 
      
Gross Debt as % of GDP 25.2  24.4  24.9 
      
Net Debt as % of GDP* 12.9   10.4  9.0 
      
*Net of pensions fund and Social Insurance Fund.
 
 According to the NIE, exports grew by 4.4 per cent in volume 
terms and 5.7 per cent in value terms in 2006. This growth was 
dominated by an increase in services exports, which grew at 10.5 
per cent in volume terms in contrast with merchandise export 
volume,  which  only  increased  by  0.8 per cent.   Overall  export  
Exports 
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Table 4: Exports of Goods and Services  
 
 
        
   2005 % Change in 2006 2006 % Change in 2007 2007 % Change in 2008 2008 
        €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
Merchandise 82,686 0.8 0.8 83,355 3.0 1.5 84,605 3.0 2.0 86,297 
Tourism 3,863 8.0 10.2 4,258 4.3  8.0 4,599 5.9 8.0 4,967 
Other Services 44,356 10.7 14.5 50,793  9.4 13.0 57,396 8.2 12.0 64,284 
           
Exports of Goods  
  and Services 130,905 4.4 5.7 138,406 5.4 5.9 146,600 5.1 6.1 155,548 
           
FISIM Adjustment 1,193   1,360   1,532   1,711 
           
Adjusted Exports 132,098 4.4 5.8 139,766 5.4 6.0 148,132 5.1 6.2 157,258 
           
 growth has continued at a similar pace in the first half of 2007. For 
the year ended 2007Q1 export volume and value growth were 4.6 
and 5.3 per cent respectively. According to the more detailed 
breakdown provided in the Balance of Payments, which only provides 
data in current prices, average annual export growth for the year 
ended 2007Q1 was dominated by a robust expansion in services 
exports, with non-tourism services exports growing by 12.9 per cent 
and tourism exports by 11.1 per cent. The value of merchandise 
exports growth was significantly lower at 0.7 per cent for the same 
period. 
 
Merchandise exports performed poorly in 2006. This poor 
performance was however dominated by events in the last quarter 
of the year. For the first three quarters of 2006 the value of 
merchandise exports grew by 3.6 per cent on average, falling to 0.8 
per cent in 2006Q4 according to the Balance of Payments. This equates 
to a 4.1 per cent year on year fall in the value of merchandise 
exports for 2006Q4. The equivalent volume measure fell by 1.4 per 
cent, reflecting the fact that merchandise export prices began to fall 
in the closing months of 2006. There were indications that the poor 
performance in the closing months of 2006 was temporary, 
particularly given the strong expansion of manufacturing output and 
a large build up of industrial stocks at the time. Our anticipation 
that these stock levels would be wound down into 2007 appears to 
have been warranted as year-on-year merchandise export volume 
growth was 7.1 per cent in the first quarter of 2007, with value 
growth of 5.5 per cent recorded for the same period. According to 
the latest External Trade statistics, the growth in the value of 
merchandise exports for the year ended June 2007 is estimated at 
2.7 per cent. Industrial production has continued to expand in 2007, 
albeit with a moderating pace as the year unfolds, and the outlook 
for most of our major trading partners, except the US, looks 
reasonably favourable over our forecast horizon. This should 
sustain the improvement of merchandise exports growth on that 
experienced in 2006. We expect growth in the volume of 
merchandise exports to be 3 per cent in 2007, expanding at the 
same rate again in 2008. Meanwhile the continuing decline in 
wholesale manufacturing prices leads us to believe that the 
merchandise export price deflator will fall by 1.5 per cent in 2007, 
contributing to a significant reduction in Ireland’s terms of trade. 
With export prices forecast to fall by a further 1 per cent in 
2008,the value of merchandise exports is anticipated to grow by 1.5 
per cent in 2007 and 2 per cent in 2008. 
  
Services accounted for 40 per cent of the total value of exports, 
and a similar proportion of the volume of exports in 2006. Services 
export growth continued to outperform that of merchandise, a 
trend that is expected to continue over our forecast horizon and 
beyond. Financial, insurance and other business services were the 
main drivers of growth in services exports last year. The latest 
Balance of Payments data indicate that these categories were again 
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 leading the expansion of the services contribution to overall export 
performance at the beginning of 2007, with average annual growth 
of 25, 15.5 and 13 per cent respectively for the year ended 2007Q1. 
Growth in the volume and value of services exports in 2007Q1 
slowed somewhat relative to 2006Q4, increasing by rates of 9.3 and 
12.7 per cent respectively. For 2007 we expect non-tourism services 
export growth of 9.4 per cent in volume terms, moderating further 
in 2008 to 8.2 per cent. Meanwhile tourism export growth is 
forecast to remain quite buoyant increasing by 8 per cent in value 
terms in both 2007 and 2008.  
 
Our forecast for 2007 is for 5.4 per cent growth in the volume 
of exports of goods and services. This is a downward revision on 
our June forecast of 6 per cent, and partially reflects the lower 
growth prospects in the US and to a lesser extent the strengthening 
of the Euro over our forecast horizon. We expect export growth to 
ease slightly to 5.1 per cent in 2008.  
Figure 6: Volume Growth Rates (Annual Average) 
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Source: Quarterly National Accounts, CSO. 
 
 The NIE shows import value and volume growth of 7.8 and 4.4 
per cent respectively for 2006. Services accounted for the bulk of 
import growth last year, growing by 7 per cent in volume terms and 
9 per cent in value terms. Merchandise imports increased by 1.6 per 
cent in volume and 6.4 per cent in value terms. Oil price increases 
through 2006 were a significant factor in overall merchandise 
import value growth. The Balance of Payments data show that tourism 
imports grew by 11.2 per cent and non-tourism services imports by 
8.4 per cent in 2006. Data for 2007Q1 indicate that total imports 
continued to increase at a similar pace into 2007, with average 
Imports 
annual volume growth of 4.5 per cent for the year ending Q1. The 
equivalent value measure increased by 6.9 per cent. 
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 Table 5: Imports of Goods and Services  
 
 
        
   2005 % Change in 2006 2006 % Change in 2007 2007 % Change in 2008 2008 
        €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
Merchandise 54,467 1.6 6.4 57,967 3.9 6.0 61,445 5.0 6.0 65,132 
Tourism 4,898  8.5 11.2 5,446  8.8 11.0 6,045 5.9  8.0 6,529 
Other Services 52,623 6.8  8.4 57,025 7.4  9.5 62,442 5.1 7.5 67,126 
           
Imports of Goods  
  and Services 111,988 4.4  7.5 120,438 5.8 7.9 129,932 5.1 6.8 138,786 
           
FISIM Adjustment 291   559    614   660 
           
Adjusted Imports 112,279 4.4  7.8 120,997 5.8 7.9 130,546 5.1 6.8 139,446 
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 Despite moving in similar fashion in recent years import volume 
growth had been higher than that of exports since 2004Q2 (see 
Figure 6). According to the latest Quarterly National Accounts this 
differen   h n   practically eliminated, with ce in growth as ow been
import volum ing ated 4.5 per cent and export e grow  at an estim
volume growth of 4.6 per cent for 2007Q1. Data from the External 
Trade statistics suggest that the value of total merchandise imports 
grew by 4.2 t in e ye ne 2007. Services import per cen  th ar to Ju
growth r the st qu r of this year to 5.9 per cent in mode ated in  fir arte
volume m and 7.9 per cent value terms. Computer and  ter s in 
financial services grew at the fastest pace in 2007Q1, with annual 
average  of per c  and 36.9 per cent respectively. value growth 43 ent
Tourism  by .9 per cent over the same period  
 
 imports grew  10
We forecast import volume growth of 5.8 per cent in 2007, 
moderating to 5.1 per cent in 2008. The growth in 2007 is expected 
to be p by growth in private consumer under inned the strong 
expenditure f elled by SSIA funds and strong wage growth of 5.5 u
per cent this year. Next years expected moderation in consumption 
growth to a sharp reduction in services imports, particularly leads 
tourism h s y 5.9 per cent, down from 8.8  whic  is foreca t to grow b
per cent in 2007. This reduction in services import growth leads to 
overall import growth slowing in 2008. 
 
 Our forecasts of merchandise exports and imports for 2007 and 
2008 lead to a further narrowing of the merchandise trade surplus 
in those years. Furtherm the merchandise terms of 
trade to  th f period as merchandise export 
prices are exp  co ue to l. Offsetting this is a narrowing 
of the service trade deficit, where services exports growth continues 
to outpace imports growth. Despite this strong performance from 
services o d expected to narrow further in 
2007 and 2008.  This is a continuati  
and refl  e poor performance the external sector in driving 
t d  in the economy. This forecast trade balance is 
equivalent to peak of 21.2 per 
cent in 2002. 
he latest data from the Balance of Payments estimate net factor 
in e t 5 per c  the year ended 2007Q1. This 
follows an estimated fall of 0.4 scale of the 
underlying gr ss flows t ugh the current account of the balance 
of payments is huge. Total debit flows in 2006 were equivalent to 
57 per cent of GNP while to t flows were at 40 per cent.  In 
terms of credit flows, almost all of the growth in 2006 was under 
p olio  othe i me, which account for 86 per 
c of total c w  terms of debit flows there was a 50 per 
c growth i nvestment flows, with a fall in 
direct investm per cent fall in repatriated 
profits flows. In recent years debit factor income flows through the 
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Table 6: Balance of Pay
ance of payments have come to be dominated by portfolio and 
other investment income flows. In 1999 total “other” debit inflows 
accounted for 41 per cent of total debit inflows, whereas in 2006 
this figure was 62 per cent.  
ments* 
        
 2005 Change 2006 Change 2007 Change 2008 
 €m % €m % €m % €m 
Merchandise Trade           
Balance 28,219 -10.0 25,388 -8.8 23,160 -8.6 21,166 
Service Trade Balance - 9,302 -20.2 -7,420 -12.5 -6,493 -32.2 -4,404 
Trade Balance in 
Goods and Services 
on BOP basis 18,917 -5.0 17,968 -7.2 16,668 0.6 16,762 
% of GNP 13.9  12.0  10.4   9.9 
Total Debit Flows 68,287 24.0 84,651 27.2 107,646 15.7 124,589 
Total Credit Flows 43,417 37.9 59,870 37.0 82,015 20.0 98,418 
Net Factor Flows  -24,870 -0.4 -24,781 3.4 -25,632 2.1 -26,171 
Net Current Transfers  265 -275.5 -465    7.5 -500 0.0 -500 
Balance on Current 
Account -5,688  -7,278  -9,464  - 9,910 
        
Capital Transfers 264 -15.5 223 34.5 300 0.0 300 
Effective Current 
Balance  -5,424  -7,055  -9,164  -9,610 
% of GNP -4.0  -4.7  -5.7  -5.7 
        
*This table includes adjustm
 the context of these very large, and often volatile gross 
.7 per cent in 2007 and 2.7 per cent in 2008; the 
cor
Measures of 
ents to Balance of Payments basis.  
 
In
investment flows, forecasting the net growth in related income 
flows is extremely difficult. For 2007 and 2008 we have reduced our 
forecast growth in net factor income to 3.4 per cent in 2007 and 2.1 
per cent in 2008. As can be seen from Table 6, together with a 
narrowing trade surplus this implies a very rapidly emerging balance 
of payments deficit in 2007, persisting into 2008. As we have argued 
previously, we consider this deficit to be an important indicator of 
the growing imbalances in the economy. It implies an effective 
current balance of -5.7 per cent of GNP in both 2007 and 2008.6
 
 Our forecast numbers imply a significant slowdown in the rate of 
growth in GNP and GDP through 2007 and into 2008. We expect 
GDP to grow by 4Growth 
responding figures for GNP are 4.4 per cent and 2.9 per cent 
respectively. More importantly, we expect that the terms of trade 
will deteriorate in 2007 and 2008, so that GNP adjusted for the 
terms of trade grows by only 3.1 per cent and 2.3 per cent in 2008 
(see Table 7). A more comprehensive measure of living standards, 
Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI), which takes account 
of current international transfers in addition to terms of trade 
 
6 In the Summer QEC the equivalent estimates for 2007 and 2008 were -4.7 and -
5.1. The 2007 figure is essentially unchanged, as the higher figure is purely driven 
by revised CSO estimates of the 2006 deficit from -3.7 per cent of GNP in the 
March QNA to -4.7 per cent in the July NIE estimates. 
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 effects, is also expected to grow more slowly than GNP. Finally, 
adjusting our estimates for changes in population and rates of net 
immigration, our forecasts imply GNP per capita growth of 1.9 per 
cent in 2007 and 1.4 per cent in 2008. 
 Measures of Growth      Table 7:
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
GDP 4.3 5.9 5.7 4.7 2.7 
GNP 3.7 4.9 6.5 4.4 2.9 
GNP adjusted for Terms of Trade 2.9 3.8 4.5 3.1 2.3 
GNDI 2.9 3.7 4.0 3.1 2.3 
GNP per cap nstanita (co t prices) 2.0 2.7 3.7 1.9 1.4 
 
 In ial clu on ion) grew by 4 er ce
s mea red by  domestic product by sector of origin. 
With tput cent n 2006, thi
m that ut in th n-c uction pon of indu
y 4.3 p  cent. presen orm nce alt
w caveat. Stocks  in 20 6 to over €1.3 billi n in vo  
2 million in 2 ng that some of 
unsold during 2006 with possible 
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oving into Q2 of 2007, the index of industrial production 
in industrial output makes forecasting difficult. Our view is that the 
non-construction part of industry will grow by 4.5 per cent in 
For 2008, we expect a slower pace of growth in industrial output. 
al dustr  output (in ding c struct .6 p nt in 2006, a su  gross
construction ou  growing by 5.3 per  i s 
eant  outp e no onstr  com ent stry 
grew b er This re ted a solid perf a hough 
ith one  grew 0 o lume
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Output 
terms (as compared to €16
e extra output was 
005), meani
th
c sequences for pricing in 2007.  
 
For 2007, the indicators are providing a mixed picture as to the 
trend in industrial output growth. According to the QNA for Q1, 
output was 14.4 per cent higher in industry (including construction) 
in 2007Q1 relative to 2006Q1. On an annual basis, the growth in 
Q1 was 7.2 per cent. A similar picture of rapid growth in industrial 
output in 2007Q1 can be seen in the index of industrial production. 
For all industries, a rise of 8 per cent was recorded in Q1; the 
corresponding figure for manufacturing industries was 8.3 per cent.  
 
M
recorded a somewhat different picture. For all industries, an 
increase of 4.9 per cent was recorded, well down on the 8 per cent 
rise in the year ended Q1. For manufacturing industries, the 
increase to the year ending 2007Q2 was 5.1 per cent. This 
slowdown in industrial performance between the two quarters is 
being driven by the modern sector. In Q1, it recorded an annual 
growth rate of 10.5 per cent but then registered more modest 
growth of 5.9 per cent in Q2, again on an annual basis.  
 
The slowdown in the rate of growth during the course of 2007 
volume terms in 2007, thereby maintaining the level of performance 
shown in 2006. However, given unfavourable price movements, we 
see output growing by a lower figure in value terms (3.5 per cent). 
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 Our forecast is for volume growth of 3 per cent, with a value 
growth of 2.5 per cent. Given the declines in house-building (as 
discussed in the Investment section), the forecast growth figures for 
total industry (i.e. including construction) are lower than those for 
Services output grew by 6.8 per cen   0  
6 per cent in value terms. As t  rates of growth exceeded 
 in industry, the trend of a gr g servic te  e 
ued. Within e secto lic 
 c “ ib n, 
ort and communications” grew  , e er 
 by 7.8 ce ll ol  t
For the first quarter of 2007, the QNA show services output 
are for volume growth 
of 3.6 per cent and for value growth of 6.5 per cent. Our forecasts 
for
nusually strong growth being recorded in 2005 (growth of 9.5 per 
cen
non-construction industry. 
 
t in volume terms in 20 6 and
by 9. hese
those owin e-in nsity of th
Irish economy has contin
administration and defence” grew by 3
 th
per 
r, “p
distr
ub
utioent, 
transp  by 4.6 per cent whil “oth
services (including rent)” grew  per nt (a  in v ume erms).  
 
growing by 6.3 per cent in volume terms, on an annual average 
basis. The growth rates by sub-sector are as follows: “public 
administration and defence” grew by 2.8 per cent, “distribution, 
transport and communications” grew by 5.4 per cent, while “other 
services (including rent)” grew by 7 per cent.  
 
For 2007, we are forecasting 5.5 per cent growth in the volume 
of services output, with the value of services output forecast to 
grow by 9.1 per cent. For 2008, our forecasts 
 favourable price movements in services are in contrast to our 
relative pessimism on industrial output prices. Given the shift 
towards a greater intensity in services exports, these relative price 
movements have important, positive impacts. 
 
Agricultural output fell by 6.8 per cent in volume terms in 2006, 
according to the NIE. However, this has to be seen in the context 
of a change in the timing of subsidy payments which led to 
u
t). For 2007, we expect volume growth of 1 per cent and value 
growth of 1.5 per cent. Our optimism for prices is partly based on 
the data so far for 2007. The agricultural output price index was 5.3 
per cent higher in June 2007 relative to June 2006, with milk prices 
showing particularly strong growth (+20.8 per cent in June 2007 
compared to June 2006). We expect volume and value growth of 1 
per cent in 2008. 
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Table 8: GDP by Sector    
 
 
        
 2005 Change  2006 Change 2007 Change 2008 
     €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
Agriculture 4,097 -6.8 -4.4 3,918 1.0 1.5 3,976 1.0 1.0 4,016 
           
Industry: 50,465 4.6 5.1 53,043 2.9 2.8 54,506 1.2 2.0 55,594 
Other Industry 36,961 4.3 2.6 37,906 4.5 3.5 39,233 3.0 2.5 40,214 
Building & Construction 13,504 5.3 12.1 15,137 -1.3 0.9 15,273 -4.1 0.7 15,380 
           
Services: 87,983 6.8 9.6 96,417 5.5 9.1 105,237 3.6 6.5 112,126 
 Public Administration & 
Defence 5,127 3.0 7.0 5,485 2.5 7.0 5,869 1.0 5.5 6,192 
 Distribution, Transport 
and Communications 21,759 4.6 6.1 23,075 4.0 6.6 24,592 2.0 3.8 25,521 
 Other Services 
(including rent) 61,098 7.8 11.1 67,857 6.3 10.2 74,776 4.3 7.5 80,413 
           
GDP at Factor Cost  - 
output basis 142,545 5.6 7.6 153,378 4.5 6.7 163,719 2.7 4.9 171,736 
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 The latest employment figures from Quarterly National Household 
Survey (QNHS) 07 u e f e g findings 
and pointers. T  remains 
strong. For the year ended 2007Q2,  
per cent; relative to 2006Q2, employment was 3.9 per cent higher. 
These are impr e numbers and show that the economy 
continues to produce jo . 
 
A closer an he latest data suggests, however, that the 
pace of employm growth has almost certainly peaked and that a 
slower pace is likely in the 
between mid-2003 and early 2006 the rate of employment growth 
had been increasing. However, since then the rate of increase has 
been falling and it is t     continue. 
The QNHS also a   rate of 
unemployment, ing fro  in Q1 to 4.6 per cent in 
Q2. 
Figure 7: Annual Em yment Grow
 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey
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appear as if a new period of adjustment is being entered. While the 
annual rate of employment growth in construction (at 9.8 per cent) 
is similar to that of recent quarters, a quarter-on quarter comparison 
shows that employment actually fell between Q1 and Q2. The 
CSO’s Index of Employment in Construction also registered a decline, 
with the index being 2.3 per cent lower in July 2007 relative to July 
2006. The latest FÁS/ESRI Vacancies Survey
was believed by us to be unsustainable and it does now 
 showed how a general 
ecline in vacancies was particularly concentrated in the 
con
ute increase was in “other services” (+17,700), with 
s of absolute extra numbers 
 
Inward migration continues to be a quantitatively important 
component of the general trends in employment. Of the 78,400 
extra jobs created between 2006Q2 and 2007Q2, some 41,200 were 
filled by immigrants (53 per cent). The “wholesale and retail” sector 
experienced the largest immigrant inflow (+10,600), followed by 
“other productive industries” (+8,300) and “hotels and restaurants” 
(+6,700). Only 10 per cent of the extra immigrants in employment 
were engaged  in the  construction sector. 
 
We now expect employment to grow by 2.5 per cent in 2007 and 
by 0.6 per cent in 2008. The slowdown in employment growth is, of 
course, related to the expected slowdown in the economy generally. 
Another expected consequence of the slowing in economic growth 
is an increase in the rate of unemployment. We now expect 
unemployment to average 4.8 per cent in 2007 and to rise to 5.6 per 
ent in 2008. We should note that this forecast for unemployment is 
ard migration. Based on an 
April-
 
d
struction sector. All of this is clearly linked to the slowdown in 
house building activity discussed in the Investment section above and 
so forms part of the broader story of current economic conditions.  
 
Partly as a result of the slowing in growth in construction 
employment, the largest absolute increase in jobs between 2006Q2 
and 2007Q2 was in “financial and other business services” (+20,300 
out of a total employment increase of 78,400). The next biggest 
absol
construction coming third in term
employed (+17,600).  
c
partly linked to our forecast for inw
to-April comparison, we expect net migration to fall from 
over 70,000 in 2007 to 25,000 in 2008. In the medium term, we see 
the labour market adjusting to inward migration through wages as 
opposed to employment. By this, we mean that the increase in the 
supply of labour brought about through immigration will act to ease 
wage pressures thereby facilitating employment increases. However, 
in the short run, we see unemployment rising in the context of 
lower employment growth and continued inward migration because 
wages may not adjust immediately to the increased labour supply 
and slower rate of increase in labour demand.  
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Table 9: Employment and Unemployment 
  
 Annual Averages 000s 
 2005 2006 2007   2008 
     
Agriculture 115 117 116 115 
Industry 539 560 559 544 
Services 1,298 1,362 1,414 1,442 
     
Total at Work 1,952 2,039 2,089 2,101 
Unemployed 89 93 105 124 
     
Labour Force 2,041 2,132 2,194 2,226 
Unemployment Rate % 4.4 4.4 4.8 5.6 
Net Migration 53.4 69.9 70.6 25.0 
   of which: Inward Migration 70.0 86.9 87.6 42.0 
Change in Participation 
Rate* 1.7 1.0 0.9 0.2 
     
* Note: Pa
y-wide figures over time, we can see that the 
te of growth appears to have picked up in the early part of 2007. 
Th
Table 10: Growth in 
rticipation rate measured as share of population aged 15-64 years. 
 
 In Table 10, we show annual hourly earnings growth for the years 
1999-2006 and also the annual rate of growth as of 2007Q1. 
Comparing the econom
ra
e fastest pace of earnings growth in 2006 was in “financial and 
business services” and this strong pace has continued into 2007, 
even though the highest rate of earnings growth in 2007Q1 was in 
“transport, storage and communications”. When viewed in the 
context of rapid employment increases in “financial and other 
business services” (discussed in the Employment section above), this 
points to strong labour demand conditions in this sector.  
verage Hourly Earnings 1999-2006 A
     
  Hourly Annualised Annual Growth**  
 Earnings Growth         
 Q1 2007 Q1 2007 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
           
  Euro % % 
Economy* 18.37 4.7 5.6 7.6 9.8 6.0 4.9 5.8 5.1 4.7 
Industry 15.48 4.5 5.3 6.1 10.4 7.9 5.4 4.7 2.9 4.1 
Construction 18.13 2.4 7.7 12.5 11.4 10.4 5.2 4.4 7.2 2.1 
Distribution 17.90 6.4 6.3 12.0 10.0 6.8 5.7 4.4 4.4 6.3 
Hotels and 
Restaurants 10.95 2.3 7.6 6.5 5.5 3.6 7.1 8.0 6.1 3.2 
Transport, Storage 
and 
Communications 20.14 7.5 3.5 5.6 8.4 1.0 5.3 5.7 4.2 6.5 
Non-Market Public 
Services 25.86 5.6 5.4 5.7 9.6 3.7 3.8 9.5 7.1 6.0 
Other Market 
Services 18.69 4.1 6.8 8.4 7.7 2.7 5.6 4.1 3.7 4.5 
Financial and Other 
Business 22.37 8.1 3.6 6.1 11.5 4.2 1.8 6.1 5.6 7.4 
           
* Weighted by employment, excludes agriculture and health sector earnings. 
** Annual growth defined as t e annual growth in the four quarter moving average ended in Quarter 4.  
Incomes 
h
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 For 2007, we expect nominal wage growth to be 5.5 per cent. 
The slowing rates of economic d to an 
easing of wage press but w mina  
h this year pa ly base y tre ds but also ecause of the 
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With falling employment growth and falling wage growth, we 
expect to see the rate of growth in income from non-agricultural 
wages declining from 9.8 per cent in 2006 to 8.3 per cent in 2007 
and further to 5.2 per cent in 2008. For 2007, a package of social 
welfare payments with significant increases means that some of the 
decline in non-agricultural wages is off-set by a rise in transfers. 
However, on the assumption that Budget 2008 will provide for 
lower than Budget 2007, we expect to see growth in gross personal 
income fall to 6.4 per cent in 2008.  
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Table 1 e  1: Personal Disposable Incom
 
   
        
 2005 Change  2006 Change 2007 Change 2008 
     €m % €m €m % €m €m % €m €m 
           
Agriculture, etc. 3,397 -5.9 -202 3,195 1.5 48 3,243 1.0 32 3,275 
Non-Agricultural 
Wages 65,992 9.8 6,434 72,426 8.3 6,016 78,442 5.2 4,079 82,522 
Other Non-Agricultural 
Income 15,409 5.3 823 16,232 7.1 1,149 17,381 8.2 1,431 18,812 
           
Total Income 
Received 84,798 8.3 7,056 91,853 7.9 7,213  99,066 5.6 5,543 104,609 
Current Transfers 18,126 1.1 203 18,329 17.9 3,273 21,601 9.9 2,129 23,730 
           
Gross Personal 
Income 102,923 7.1 7,259 110,182 9.5 10,486 120,668 6.4 7,671 128,339 
Direct Personal Taxes 19,561 9.2 1,800 21,362 9.7 2,080 23,441 5.3 1,242 24,683 
           
Personal Disposable 
Income  83,362 6.5 5,459 88,820 9.5 8,406 97,226 6.6 6,430 103,656 
Consumption 76,435  7.9 6,048 82,483 11.3 9,290 91,773 6.1 5,580 97,353 
Personal Savings 6,926 -8.5 -590 6,337 -13.9 - 884 5,453 15.6 850 6,303 
Savings Ratio  8.3    7.1   5.6   6.1 
Average Personal 
Tax Rate 19.0   19.4   19.4   19.2 
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Figure 8: CPI Inflation Rate 
 
Source: Consumer Price Index
 
The in omponent driving this  in consum prices is the 
rise in m age interest rates over the period. Following eight 25 
basis po  in a  in he E Ref ing rat ce the end of 
2005, the mortgage interes c e
per cent in August 2007 when compared to the same month in 
2006. Given the treatment of the mortgage interest component in 
calculating the   o fo c  of the 
total incre  prices nts have also 
increased sharply, in by gust 2006 to 
August 2007. 
 
As ex o s ete  in  r is useful to 
examine e CPI ponents hat ar least in part, by 
domesti es.. Of these the most noteworthy increases in price 
from August 2006 to August 2007 are found in electricity, gas and 
ot  fue r c stal t), t ansport 
s  (10.4 p  cent), health insurance (9.7 per ), recreational 
and orting services (7.1 per cent) and hotels and restaurants (3.8 
per cent r i p cent of 
the overall n e p and llustrate 
continuing robust inflation in the ser . 
I ion for services averaged 8.6 per cent in the twelve months to 
August 2007, while inflation for goods averaged 0.2 per cent over 
the same perio
 
 
8 For a detailed discussion o ating the 
Iris ee Mc  in e Irish 
Consumer Price Index”, published along with this Commentary. 
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 Ireland continues to b
consumer price inflatio
e above the Euro Area average in terms of 
n. Using the EU Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP), which excludes mortgage interest and 
certain non-traded items9, Irelands year on year rate of inflation in 
August 2007 was 2.3 per cent. This measure of inflation has 
averaged 2.6 per cent for the twelve months up to and including 
August 2007, which is significantly higher than the comparable 
Euro Area average of 1.8 per cent. Our forecasts (Table 12) see 
Ireland remaining well above the Euro Area average for inflation as 
measured by HICP, with rates of 2.8 per cent in 2007 and 2.5 per 
cent in 2008. 
Table 12: Inflation Measures (%) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
HICP (Ireland) 5.3 4.0 4.7 4.0 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.8 2.5 
CPI 5.6 4.9 4.6 3.5 2.2 2.4 3.9 4.9 3.4 
Mortgage Interest 12.5 24.7 -7.6 -8.3 5.4 12.3 31.4 40.0 14.1 
HICP (Euro Area) 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.1 
          
 
An increasingly important factor in determining the course of 
inf
tantially through 2007 as a result, with the annual rate 
anding at 2.7 per cent in August, significantly higher than recent 
mo
 
 
lation over our forecast horizon will be food prices. Adverse 
weather conditions across the globe in 2007 have led to significant 
reductions in crop yields, with wheat being a particular concern. 
Combined with strong demand growth from countries in the 
Middle-East and Asia and more agricultural land being devoted to 
bio-fuel crops, this has led to wheat prices reaching record highs in 
recent weeks. As a staple ingredient in animal feed, the effect of 
these price increases will be felt not just in bread and cereals but 
also in meat and dairy products. Food price inflation has already 
increased subs
st
nths. Our forecasts assume that food prices add approximately 
0.1 per cent to the CPI rate of inflation in 2008 above what it would 
have been had food prices continued to grow to trend. 
 
Increases in health insurance premia and reductions in the price 
of natural gas and electricity have also been factored into our 
forecasts, but their effects on overall inflation are miniscule. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 In addition to mortgage interest, the HICP also excludes building materials; 
concrete blocks; union subscriptions; motor car insurance; dwellings insurance; 
motor car tax and motor cycle tax. 
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Interest rates remain the key factor in forecasting CPI inflation 
for 2007 and 2008. Our forecasts are driven by the technical 
assumption of one further 25 basis point interest rate increase in 
December of this year, with the ECB Main Refinancing Rate 
remaining at 4.25 per cent through 2008. We expect inflation to 
peak towards the end of 2007 (Figure 9), with the annual average 
rate for the year being 4.9 per cent. As a result of the technical 
assumption on interest rates, the annual average inflation rate is 
anticipated to fall to 3.4 per cent for 2008. When compared to our 
forecasts in the previous Commentary, the inflation rate for 2007 
remains the same. This is in spite of the assumption on interest 
rates differing between both forecasts in terms of timing: our June 
2007 QEC assumed an interest rate increase in September as 
opposed to December. All else being equal this would have led to a 
downward revision of the 2007 forecast; however, the higher than 
anti ated inflation in recent months, particularly in food pricip
lies that the annual average inflation rate remains the same. The 
same cannot be said for our current 2008 forecast compared to that 
of the June 2007 QEC, which increases from 3 per cent to 3.4 per 
cen as a result of the assumed interest rate increase movingt 
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 GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
For 2007, the forecasts in this Commentary show a slight downward 
adjustment relative to our previous set of forecasts in the June issue. 
However, for 2008 we have made a more significant downward 
adjustment and have cut our forecasts for GNP growth from 3.7 
per cent to 2.9 per cent. As discussed above, we have made this 
adjustment largely because of the flow of information on house 
building. When writing in June, we did make reference to our 
 than 
we we sting at that time. The data that have emerged since 
ave led us to be more convinced that the slowdown between 2007 
and
hern Rock mean that the possibility needs to be 
recognised. However, our understanding is that the likelihood of a 
European banking collapse is remote, based on our observations of 
central banks’ actions in recent weeks in support of the financial 
system. 
 
Whatever the on-going fallout brings, the hope would be that 
the period of financial uncertainty will end before too long as a 
greater degree of transparency emerges over where the exposure to 
the sub-prime lies. It is possible that the current uncertainty will 
have eased by the time of the next Commentary.  
concerns that the slowdown in the economy could be steeper
re foreca
h
 2008 will indeed be more rapid.  
 
The data on house building provide a clearer sense of the 
direction of trends as we look ahead. However, the general climate 
in which this Commentary is being written is characterised by 
uncertainty, in particular with respect to financial markets. By their 
nature, it is difficult to factor these types of uncertainties into our 
forecasts. Nevertheless, it is still of value to discuss them and their 
possible implications.  
 
Foremost among the uncertainties confronting us has been the 
fallout from the difficulties being experienced in the sub-prime 
sector of the US lending market. One impact has been a rise in 
market interest rates over central bank-determined base rates. 
Should this continue, Irish borrowers could be asked to pay higher 
interest rates as banks try to pass on the higher borrowing costs that 
they incur when borrowing on inter-bank markets. The potentially 
more extreme fall-out from the sub-prime market difficulties would 
be a banking collapse. It may seem extraordinary for such a 
possibility to be mentioned in a Commentary but the circumstances 
surrounding Nort
41 
 Moving ime m  
another set of uncertainties relate to the prospects for the US 
economy generally and for the dollar in particular. In earlier 
Commentaries, we were guided by the more positive views of the US 
beyond the sub-pr arket, although not unrelated,
economy that saw the slowdown in house-building there as being 
contained, in the sense of not having large knock-on effects on 
other elements of the economy such as consumption. Based on that 
view, we were broadly optimistic that the US would regain 
momentum in 2008. However, more recent data from the US have 
us to believe that US growth in 2008 will be closer to 2 per cent, 
n the second scenario, the 
ef
between 2010 and 2015. Under the low 
ro
e impact of the dollar decline on Euro Area GDP is 
r
led 
as opposed to the 2.5 per cent that we reported in our June 
Commentary. As regards the dollar, as of mid-September record lows 
vis-à-vis the euro were being recorded with the $1.40 mark being 
approached. Part of the dollar weakness was and continues to be 
associated with expected interest rate cuts in the US.  
 
These developments in the US bring to mind results from the 
ESRI’s Medium-Term Review of 2005 and the Spring 2007 Euroframe- 
European Forecasting Network report. In the MTR 2005, growth 
prospects for the Irish economy were compared under two 
scenarios for the US. In one scenario, the US current account 
eficit remained at existing high levels; id
d icit came within sustainable limits as a result of reduced growth 
(2.1 per cent on average per annum out to 2010 as opposed to 2.5 
per cent) and a weaker dollar ($1.50 in 2010 as opposed to $1.34).  
 
The difference in Irish growth as a result of these two scenarios 
was large. Under the high growth scenario, GNP was expected to 
grow by 4 per cent per annum between 2005 and 2010 and by 4.9 
er cent per annum p
g wth/weaker dollar scenario, the corresponding Irish growth 
rates were expected to be 3.5 per cent (2005-2010) and 3.1 per cent 
(2010-2015). In terms of unemployment rates, the higher growth 
scenario envisaged rates of 4.2 per cent between 2005 and 2010 and 
3.6 per cent between 2010 and 2015. The corresponding figures for 
the low growth/weaker dollar scenario were 7.1 per cent and 6.4 
per cent respectively. These figures serve to re-emphasise the strong 
relationship between US and Irish growth rates and hence the 
potential importance of current developments in the US for Ireland.  
 
The result from the spring EFN report that is of relevance 
concerns the relative impacts on Euro Area GDP of different forms 
of US adjustment. In that report, the impacts on the Euro Area of 
an internal adjustment (a US house price fall) and an external 
adjustment (a dollar fall) were compared. It turns out that in the 
ort run, thsh
th ee times higher than the house price decline, when the two 
shocks are calibrated to have the same impact on the US current 
account. If this result applies to Ireland, then the dollar decline 
becomes of particular concern. 
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 Within Ireland, house prices continue to be an area of 
uncertainty. While our forecasts suggest moderate declines in 
nominal prices this year and generally stable nominal prices next 
year, our on-going estimate, discussed in the Investment section, is 
that house prices in Ireland were over-valued by about 15 per cent 
in 2006. This over-valuation falls to under 10 per cent by 2008 
given our forecast decline in house prices and house building. 
However, the uncertainty in world financial markets could well lead 
to a more significant fall in the demand for second homes than that 
implied in our forecasts. Were this to happen, then our estimates 
suggest that house prices could fall further by 2008.  
 
In the context of possible house price falls, the paper published 
along with this Commentary by Vincent Hogan and Pat O’Sullivan 
provides important results for assessing the possible impacts. As 
ogan and O’Sullivan show there was little impact on consumption  
as 
 
ouse-building. If house prices fall further than we are forecasting, 
ho
Instead, policy at this time of uncertainty should aim to provide 
sta
orecasts are based on a growth in 
voted current expenditure of 8 per cent, together with full 
H
a result of house price rises, it appears that consumption should 
not fall in response to any house price falls. This is in contrast to 
the US where the link between consumption and house price rises 
contributed to the recent US growth experience (and hence leads to 
concerns as house prices fall). However, as house-building in 
Ireland is likely to be sensitive to movements in house prices, there 
remains a possibility that a house price fall could impact on the 
economy via a fall in investment. As discussed in the Investment 
section, our forecasts are sensitive to the extent of the decline in
h
use-building could well be lower and hence overall growth would 
be lower also.  
 
Given the outlook for house-building in Ireland and the 
uncertainties regarding economic activity in the US, the strength of 
the US dollar and house prices in Ireland, the question arises over 
what policy can and should do. The first broad point to be made is 
that the adjustments in the housing market, both in terms of 
building activity and price, are part of a process of returning the 
Irish economy to a sustainable growth path. We do not see that 
there is a role for government in artificially propping up either 
prices or building activity. 
 
bility. For this reason we see a need for the rapid acceleration in 
current expenditure in recent years to be halted. Based on forecasts, 
it appears that the General Government Surplus in 2006 of over 2.9 
per cent of GDP will be reduced to 0.7 per cent of GDP in 2007. 
While it is likely that the growth in voted capital spending of 16 per 
cent is contributing to an expansion of the productive capacity in 
the economy, the growth in voted current expenditure of 12.9 per 
cent appears to be unsustainable. A curtailing of this rate of growth 
will be needed in order to safeguard the general soundness of the 
public finances. For 2008 our f
43 
 imp
th 
 to be maintained, albeit at a more moderate pace than the very 
rec
 
lementation of the NDP. On this basis we estimate that the 
General Government Surplus would be eliminated by the end of 
2008. In the context of a sharp slowdown in the economy, we see 
this as being no cause for concern and would consider that a mildly 
stimulatory budget in 2008 is affordable in the context of overall 
prudent macroeconomic management. 
 
Beyond this, the policies that are needed in the face of the 
adjustments being experienced by the Irish economy are medium-
term in nature. The decline in house-building means that other 
sectors of the economy will have to grow if a strong pace of grow
is
ent past. In order for this to happen, there is a need for on-going 
investment in infrastructure, in human resources and in R&D, 
although the capacity of the economy to absorb the extra spending 
should be continually assessed. With the slowing of activity in 
construction, fears that were expressed about the potential 
inflationary impact of the NDP are receding.10 However, specific 
bottlenecks may still exists, for example, with regard to certain 
skills. There is also an on-going need for the provision of an 
improved business climate, for example, through the promotion of 
increased competition. But, as noted, the impacts of such policies 
are likely to be felt in the medium term.  
 
 
 
 
 
10 Morgenroth, E. and J. Fitz Gerald (eds.), 2006, Dublin: The Economic and 
Social Research Institute, Ex-Ante Evaluation of the Investment Priorities for the National 
Development Plan 2007-2013, ESRI Policy Research Paper No. 59. 
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CONSUMPTION AND 
HOUSE PRICES IN 
IRELAND 
V. Hogan, P. O’Sullivan 
 
 
We examine the link between private consumption and housing wealth in 
Ireland. We find that until very recently the marginal propensity to consume out 
of housing wealth was essentially zero. This is in marked contrast to the recent 
evidence for other OECD countries. The evidence is robust to changes in 
statistical methodology. Thus we can conclude that the recent consumption growth 
was not financed by borrowing against housing wealth. This suggests that any 
decline in house prices would not cut consumption significantly.  
Abstract 
 
 The well-documented rise in Irish house prices in recent years has 
led to some public disquiet on two related questions:  the 
sustainability of the property market itself; and the effect of any 
collapse on the economy in general. Some commentators worry that 
the property boom represents an unsustainable bubble market, 
which will inevitably burst with possibly dire consequences for the 
economy as a whole. Parallels are often drawn with the collapse of 
the UK property market in the late 1980s and the early 1990s and 
the resulting negative equity problem.1  
1. 
 Introduction 
 
In fact these two questions are closely related to the overall 
question of how housing wealth affects private consumption and 
savings decisions. For years economists have recognised that 
rational individuals should change the level of their consumption 
only in response to permanent changes in their wealth. Temporary 
Quarterly Economic Commentary, Autumn 2007, pp. 46-61 
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1 See “House of Cards”, a survey of European property markets in the Economist, 
May 29th, 2003. Roche (2003) criticises the Economist’s methodology. He suggests 
that the Irish housing market was then overvalued by no more than 5 per cent. 
 
Corresponding author: vincent.hogan@ucd.ie 
changes in wealth should have little or no effect on consumption 
decisions.2  
 
It would, therefore, be reasonable to expect an increase in 
private consumption in recent years from the growth in housing 
wealth in Ireland. Of course, it may be the case that individuals are 
cautious about borrowing against housing wealth because of the 
psychological importance of home ownership, the desire to make 
housing bequests and the general illiquidity of housing wealth etc. 
Thus we might expect that the marginal propensity to consume out 
of housing wealth to be less then the marginal propensity to 
consume out of financial wealth – but we would not expect it to be 
zero. This is confirmed by most of the international evidence (see 
below).  
 
We might think, therefore, that the Irish experience mirrors the 
international experience: large scale increases in consumption 
caused by increases in housing wealth. The fact that a boom in 
house prices and a consumer boom have been coincident does not 
allow us to infer causation. In the Irish case at least, there is a 
plausible alternative explanation for both: the large increase in 
national income since the early 1990s could in principle be 
responsible for both the boom in house prices and the boom in 
consumption.  
 
In what follows, we show that until very recently, the dramatic 
rise in personal income has explained all of the increase in 
consumption and the marginal propensity to consume out of 
housing wealth is essentially zero. This implies that either the 
population do not believe that the increase in house prices over the 
last decade are credible or that they are using the accumulated 
wealth for purposes other than consumption. However, this result 
also suggests that the consequences of a large correction in house 
prices may not be as dire as some have feared. If people have not 
borrowed against housing wealth to boost consumption then a 
decline in the housing market would have a limited effect on 
aggregate consumption, limiting the recessionary effects of a large 
fall in house prices.  
 
The idea of inferring the sustainability of a boom in asset prices 
from its effect on private consumption is not new. It has been 
observed, for example, that the boom in stock prices in the US 
seemed to have little effect on private consumption, suggesting that 
most private individuals viewed the changes in their wealth as 
temporary. Furthermore, when the stock market bubble burst in 
Summer 2000, there was little recessionary effect on private 
 
2 For an overview of consumption theory see Deaton (1992) or Attanasio (1999). 
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consumption – even allowing for the accommodating monetary 
policy adopted by world central banks.3 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the 
international evidence on the link between housing market and 
private consumption and savings. In Section 3, we review the recent 
experience of the Irish economy in general and of the housing 
market in particular. In Section 4, we present a formal econometric 
model of the link between Irish consumption and the housing 
market. We show that our estimate – of essentially zero effect – is 
robust to various methodological and data issues. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
 
 There are two broad strands to the literature that are relevant to 
our discussion. The first uses aggregate data on house prices and 
consumption to measure the effect of housing wealth on 
consumption. The second strand to the literature uses data on micro 
survey data to look at the effect of housing wealth on individuals’ 
consumption. 
2. 
 Review of 
Theory and 
Evidence 
 
Using aggregate US data, Elliot (1980) found no effect upon 
consumption from changes in non-financial wealth. These results 
were challenged by Peek (1983) and by Bhatia (1987) who raised 
questions over the methodology used to estimate real non-financial 
wealth. But in general, for the United States, time series estimates of 
the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of housing wealth 
were around 0.04. In other words, for every $1 billion increase in 
housing wealth, personal consumption increased by $40 million.  
 
Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) argue that the increase in 
housing wealth was a significant explanatory variable in the context 
of the UK consumer led economic boom in the late 1980s. They 
estimated the elasticity of consumption with regard to housing 
wealth to be 0.045. So a 10 per cent increase in housing wealth 
would lead to 0.45 per cent increase in consumption. 
 
Kenny (1998) and Miles (1992, 1994) both argue that there are 
good reasons to remain sceptical of evidence that increases in 
housing wealth will have an unambiguously positive effect on 
consumption. This is especially so if a house price boom occurs at 
the same time as a consumption boom as both phenomena could be 
explained by other variables such as rising real incomes, 
expectations thereof or looser credit constraints.  
 
Furthermore, as Miles (1994) argues, an increase in prices may 
boost the consumption of those who intend to trade down at some 
 
3 See lecture delivered by Professor Jaime Ventura, Department of Economics, 
MIT at a conference held by Bank of Ireland Private Banking, Dublin Castle, 
 June 7, 2001. 
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time in the future, but those who intend to trade up and first time 
entrants are hurt by price increases and may be forced to cut back 
on consumption. Therefore, unless households have the ability to 
exit the housing market en masse then the aggregate wealth effects 
on consumption could be negligible.  
 
Engelhardt (1996) examined the link between house price 
appreciation and the savings behaviour of homeowners during the 
1980s using micro data. The analysis used self-reported household 
asset and debt data for a sample of home-owning households under 
the age of 65 from the 1984 and 1989 waves of the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) to construct changes in real household 
wealth as a measure of household saving behaviour. Cross-time and 
cross-regional variation in housing market conditions were used to 
identify behavioural savings effects. The estimated marginal 
propensity to consume out of real housing capital gains was 0.03 for 
the median household. More recently, Bostic et al. (2005) reported 
estimates of the MPC generated from the US Consumer 
Expenditure Survey of 0.03. 
 
Disney et al. (2002) performed a similar analysis for the UK. 
They found a marginal propensity consume out of housing wealth 
of between 0.01 and 0.03. They also found that the effect of 
housing wealth was higher in absolute terms when house prices 
were rising i.e. the effect of housing wealth was asymmetric. 
 
McCarthy and Steindel (2007) provide a review of recent US 
evidence. They show that there is a considerable variation in 
estimates of the marginal propensity to consume from housing 
wealth. Estimates based on aggregate data tend to be around 0.05 
whereas estimates based on individual level data tend to be around 
half as large. Belsky and Prakken (2004) using aggregate data, 
estimate the MPC to be 0.05. Iacoviello (2004) also uses aggregate 
data but generates estimates of 0.07. 
 
Kenny (1998) focuses on the linkages between the Irish housing 
market and the economy and one of his main findings is: 
…that the response of consumption depends on the type of shock hitting the 
housing market. In the case of a purely random increase in house prices (a house 
price shock), there is some evidence in support of the thesis that this gives rise to 
a positive deviation in consumption above its equilibrium given the level of 
income. However, in the case of an income shock, while the model gives rise to a 
positive response in both consumption and real house prices, there would appear 
to be no evidence that consumption rises above or overshoots its new equilibrium 
level.  
 
This again highlights the issue of causation and warns against the 
simplistic link between housing wealth and consumption. 
 
Case et al. (2001) examine the link between increases in housing 
wealth, financial wealth and consumer spending using a panel of 
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aggregate macroeconomic data. They perform two separate analyses 
one using a panel of 14 countries (including Ireland) observed 
annually during the past 25 years and the other using a panel of U.S. 
states observed quarterly during the 1980s and 1990s. They found 
that housing wealth has a statistically significant impact on aggregate 
household consumption. Perhaps surprisingly, they found that 
housing wealth had a larger effect on consumption than financial 
wealth. Their results suggest that the marginal propensity to 
consume out of housing wealth is 0.11 on average for western 
countries. Their results, however, do not account for possible 
simultaneous equation bias. Furthermore, they hide a potentially 
large degree of variation across countries. 
 
Girourard and Blondal (2001) also examined the impact of 
house prices on consumption and residential investment using a 
panel of G7 (excluding Germany) countries. Their main conclusion 
is that house prices have a significant effect on consumption 
through either direct wealth effects or the easing of households’ 
liquidity constraints. All the countries, with the exception of Italy, 
exhibited a significant and positive housing wealth effect on 
consumption. They argue that the role of the financial system is 
critical in the translation of increased housing wealth into increased 
consumption. The ability to borrow or withdraw equity is the prime 
mechanism to access housing wealth.  
 
The international evidence does point to a housing wealth effect 
on consumption but the regressions and results rely on evidence 
from various G7 countries. Inferences from this international 
evidence have been drawn in describing the Irish economic 
performance since the early 1990s. This paper attempts to analyse 
the importance of the increased housing wealth in terms of the 
consumption and economic boom in Ireland.   
 
 Figures 1 and 2 show the trend in nominal and real Irish second 
hand house prices from 1970-2005 from the Department of the 
Environment’s national average second-hand house price series.4 
Over the period prices in nominal terms rose quite strongly, 
averaging close to 12 per cent, however these gains were 
significantly eroded by inflation and in real terms, house prices 
(deflated by the GDP deflator) rose by only 3.5 per cent on average 
per annum. In the period 1971-79 (see Table 2) nominal house 
prices rose by just 16 per cent on average per annum, but again the 
performance in real terms was significantly lower, rising by a little 
over 2 per cent on average per annum. In the 10 years from 1980 to 
1989 nominal second-hand house prices rose by 6 per cent per 
annum but actually fell by 1 per cent in real terms. From 1994 to 
2003 second-hand house prices rose by 16 per cent per annum in 
3. 
 A First Look 
at the Data 
 
4 Table 1 gives the precise definitions and sources of the data used in the paper.  
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nominal terms and more significantly by 12 per cent in real terms 
per annum. 
 
Figure 1: Irish Second-Hand House Prices 
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Figure 2: Irish Real Second-Hand House Prices 
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
Ye
ar
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
Year
€
 
 
51 
Table 2: Growth Rates 
    
 1970-1979 1980-1989 1994-2003 
 Cumulative 
Growth 
% 
Growth 
p.a. 
% 
Cumulative 
Growth 
% 
Growth 
p.a. 
% 
Cumulative 
Growth 
% 
Growth 
p.a. 
% 
House Prices1 (nominal) 278 16 76 6 297 16 
House Prices (real) 20 2 -10 -1 182 12 
Consumption (per capita) 27 3 16 2 56 5 
PDI 
(per capita) 33 3 10 1 58 5 
Housing Wealth 
(per capita)  27 3 2 0 219 14 
       
1. National price of second-hand houses. 
2. Consumption, Income, house prices and wealth deflated by the consumption deflator (100 in 1995). 
 
As can be seen from Figure 3, this boom in house prices, 
combined with a boom in house building, lead to a dramatic 
increase in housing wealth per capita. Between 1994 and 2003, 
housing wealth per capita more than tripled (see Table 2).  
 
Figure 3: Housing Wealth per Capita 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
Ye
ar
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
Year
€
 
Figures 4 and 5 show that the increase in wealth coincided with a 
general boom in the Irish economy, with a cumulative rise in real 
GNP per capita of 70 per cent over the period 1994 to 2003. 
During this period, real personal consumption rose by 56 per cent. 
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Figure 4: Irish Real Personal Consumption Deflator: Personal Consumption Deflator, 
 1995=100 
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Figure 5: Irish Real Personal Disposable Incomes Deflator: Personal Consumption 
Deflator, 1995=100  
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This has raised inevitable questions about the contribution of the 
increase in housing wealth to the consumer and economic boom. 
The rise in house prices did not occur in isolation, as real personal 
disposable income growth was very robust, rising by 58 per cent on 
a cumulative basis. Thus, an obvious question is whether the rise in 
house prices played any meaningful role in explaining personal 
consumption growth or can real income growth unilaterally explain 
Irish personal consumption?  
 
 The standard framework for examining consumption, income and 
savings is the permanent income-life cycle hypothesis. The central 
tenant of the model is that consumption decisions are made in order 
to maximise utility over time. Furthermore, the level of 
consumption will only be affected by the permanent component of 
changes in income or wealth (financial and non-financial). Case et al. 
(2001) argue that consumers will distribute anticipated increases in 
permanent wealth over their life cycle and the marginal propensity 
to consume (MPC) out of wealth will be the same for all sources of 
wealth. There are, however, reasons why the MPC could be 
different for housing wealth than for other forms of wealth. First, if 
an accumulation of housing wealth were deemed to be temporary, 
then a rational agent would refrain from consuming it. Second, 
housing wealth could be used for investment purposes. Third, a 
bequest motive may induce individuals to keep property holdings 
intact until death in preference to financial assets. More generally, 
there could be an emotional dimension to the ownership of a family 
home that is not present for other forms of wealth. All of these 
effects would lead to an MPC from housing wealth that is lower 
than the MPC for wealth in general. 
4.  
A Simple 
Econometric 
Model of 
Housing and 
Consumption 
 
The basic strategy is to estimate a model similar in structure to 
Case et al. (2001). In essence we run a regression of consumption on 
disposable income and the value of the housing stock. All variables 
are in real per capita terms and as defined in Table 1.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 We also tried adjusting personal disposable income to explicitly exclude income 
arising from property. However, the results are the same as using the usual NIE 
definition and we do not present them here. 
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Table 1: Data Sources and Construction 
   
Variable Definition Construction /ESRI 
Mnemonic 
PC_nom Nominal Private Consumption B0501 
PC_real Real Private Consumption B0601 
PDI_nom Nominal Personal Disposable Income B0907- B0909 
HSTOCK Housing Stock HSTOCK3 
GNP Real GNP B0422 
PSECN Average national price of second-hand 
houses 
PHOLD 
P Consumption Deflator PC_Nom/PC_real 
Int4 Long-term interest rates RGL 
GC_nom 
 
Nominal Government Consumption B0502 
 
POP Population NT 
POTY Potential Output HP Filtered GNP 
PDI Real per capita personal disposable income (PDI_Nom)/(P*POP) 
GC Real per capita government consumption GC_nom/( P*POP) 
HWEALTH Real per capita housing wealth HSTOCK*PSECN/(P*POP) 
CONS Real per capita private consumption PC_real/POP 
Real_i Real long term interest rate Int-(lnPt-lnPt-1) 
 
 
1. This data from ESRI Databank but supplemented for 2003 using NIE from 
CSO, Dublin.  
2. This data from ESRI Databank but supplemented for 1970-74 using data from 
Department of the Environment, Dublin. 
3. Second-hand house prices are not available 1970-73 so we use data extrapolated 
back from the 1974 observation using the growth in the price of new housing. 
4. Short-term interest rates are available only since 1975. 
5. HSTOCK3 is the estimated stock of permanent dwellings. Using houses 
completed in year and benchmarked on Census 1991, 1996 and 2002.  
 
Table 3 shows the results. The first column presents the results 
of a simple OLS regression of consumption on income, interest 
rates and housing wealth. (Note that the numbers in parenthesis are 
t-statistics of the significance of the variables.) As can be seen, 
housing wealth turns out to be statistically insignificant. The p-value 
generated by a t-test of the null hypothesis that housing wealth has 
no effect on consumption is 0.34 indicating that the null hypothesis 
that housing wealth has no impact on consumption cannot be 
rejected at the usual significance levels.  
 
The results in column 1 show that interest rates have positive 
and statistically significant effect on consumption. This is 
implausible and may suggest that the estimates are biased. This 
could be so because of the presence of stochastic time trends. If all 
the variables are increasing over time, the OLS may capture this 
rather than any true causal relationship between them. Figures 1-5 
suggest that the main variables are indeed trending up. This is 
confirmed by formal testing of the three variables for unit roots. We 
cannot reject the presence of a unit root in any of the three variables  
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at the usual significance levels.6 One way to take account of 
integrated regressors is to include lags of the variables in the 
regression.7 This we do in the second column of Table 3. 
Table 3: Econometric Results 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS 
1970-2003 
OLS 
1971-2003 
IV 
1972-2003 
IV 
1972-1994 
Intercept -247.88 
(1.14) 
-287.56 
(1.17) 
140.42 
(0.34) 
-138.42 
(0.36) 
CONSt-1  0.31 
(1.42) 
0.20 
(0.62) 
0.45 
(1.40) 
PDIt 0.95 
(18.42) 
0.76 
(5.52) 
0.65 
(2.50) 
0.77 
(2.60) 
PDIt-1  -0.07 
(0.43) 
0.06 
(0.25) 
-0.26 
(1.39) 
HWEALTHt -0.07 
(0.96) 
0.16 
(0.94) 
0.63 
(1.77) 
 
HWEALTHt-1  -0.28 
(1.72) 
-0.71 
(2.17) 
 
Real Interestt 18.58 
(2.39) 
8.66 
(0.82) 
-28.60 
(1.01) 
19.40 
(1.25) 
Real Inteterstt-1  8.70 
(0.71) 
-46.99 
(1.68) 
-1.39 
(0.09) 
     
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 
     
p-value from 
Test of MPC of 
HWEALTH = 0 
 
0.34 
 
0.11 
 
0.45 
 
- 
     
1. Dependent variable is consumption. 
2. All variables in real per-capita terms. 
3. Absolute values of  t-Statistics in parentheses. 
4. Instruments are: Real_i t-1,  GCt, GCt-1, POTYt, POTYt-1 
 
The coefficients on interest rates remain positive but are now 
insignificant. More importantly for our purposes, it is clear that 
there is no change in the basic result: most of the change in 
consumption is explained by changes in income. The coefficient on 
current housing wealth is insignificant whereas the coefficient on 
lagged housing wealth is borderline significant (p-value of 0.1).  
 
A test of hypothesis that the long run MPC out of housing 
wealth is zero is implemented as a Wald test of the hypothesis that 
the sum of the coefficients on housing wealth are zero. This 
 
6 Specifically we perform Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests with two lags in the 
testing regression. The resulting t-statistics are 1.02 for CONS; 1.49 for PDI; and 
2.10 for HWEALTH. All are greater than the critical value at 10 per cent 
significance level, which is -2.62. 
7 If the data is co-integrated then, Equation (1) in Table 3 constitutes an estimate 
on one of the co-integrating vectors. A test of the residuals from this regression 
gives an Augmented Dickey Fuller t-statistic of -4.98. This allows us to reject the 
null hypothesis of no co-integration at any significance level greater than 0.01. This 
test uses critical values reported in Hamilton (1994) p. 766. This suggests that the 
consumption is co-integrated with income and interest rates but not HWEALTH 
(as its coefficient is insignificantly different from zero).  
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produces a p-value of 0.11. Again we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that housing wealth has no effect on consumption – albeit a 
marginal rejection in this case.  
 
These results stand in contrast to results for other countries. 
McCarthy and Steindel (2007) note that estimates using aggregate 
data tend to produce estimates of the MPC of above 0.05 for the 
US. In a similar vein, Case et al. (2001) found an average MPC for 
western countries of 0.11 using aggregate data.  
 
Engelhardt (1996) found that there is an asymmetry in the 
consumption and saving behaviour of households and that 
consumption reacted more when house prices were declining than 
when prices were rising. Disney et al. (2002) found the opposite for 
the UK. We tested for asymmetry by taking the regression in 
column 2 and adding to it, a dummy set equal to one if growth in 
wealth was positive. It turned out that this dummy was insignificant 
(p-value of 0.12) indicating that asymmetry was not important in the 
Irish case.8   
 
Note that, in column 2, the sum of the coefficients on housing 
wealth is negative, implying that increasing housing wealth reduces 
consumption. This does not seem a plausible result. This may 
suggest that the estimates are inconsistent due to the presence of 
simultaneous equation bias. Consumption is a function of income. 
But aggregate consumption is a component part of GDP, which in 
turn is the major determinant of PDI, so that income is also a 
function of consumption. Failure to take account of this circular 
relationship will bias not only the estimate of the income 
coefficients but also the estimates of the MPC out of housing 
wealth. Similarly, housing wealth itself is affected by GDP and it 
could be an indirect function of consumption also. In order to 
control for these potential biases we re-estimate the model using 
Instrumental Variables in the third column of Table 3. For 
instruments we have the lagged values of all variables and, in 
addition, current real government consumption per capita, potential 
GDP per capita and lagged real interest rates. Standard tests suggest 
these are reasonably good instruments.9 
 
The results of the IV estimation are little different from the 
simple model: the current housing wealth variable is insignificant at 
the 5 per cent level (p-value of 0.08) while the lagged wealth is 
 
8 The results of this regression are available on request.  Of course, the 
insignificance could reflect the fact that there were only 9 years during the sample 
when housing wealth actually declined. 
9 The regression of the endogenous variables on the instruments yields a R-squared 
of 0.98 for PDI and 0.98 for HWEALTH. However, F-test of the exclusion of 
GC, POTY, Real_i and their lags from this regression is 9.01 for PDI, 7.82 for 
CONS and 8.45 for HWEALTH. Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest that a value 
above 5 is desirable. 
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significant (p-value 0.04). As before, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the MPC out of housing wealth (the sum of coefficients on 
housing wealth) is zero.  
 
Finally, we run the IV regression of column 3 again, but this 
time on a sample ending in 1994. The idea here is that the Irish 
economy in general and the housing market in particular grew at 
unprecedented rates after 1994 (see Figures 1-5). This superior 
performance is almost certainly a temporary phenomenon and its 
presence may distort our estimates of the effect of housing wealth 
on consumption. By restricting the sample to a period of more 
reasonable growth, we would hope to capture the true underlying 
relationship between consumption and housing wealth.   
 
In addition we drop the housing wealth variable from the 
estimation equation. Unsurprisingly, given the previous results, this 
does not change the R-squared or the other coefficients 
significantly. As can be seen from column 4, the restricted sample 
produces essentially the same results as before.   
 
Figure 6: Actual and Forecast Consumption  
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Actual Consumption 
Consumption Forecast 95 per cent, Confidence Interval    
 
We can use this model to create a forecast of what consumption 
would be given income in the years 1995-2005 and compare it with 
the actual outcome. We present a graph of this forecast in Figure 6, 
where the solid line represents the actual consumption that occurred 
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and the dotted lines represent the 95 per cent confidence interval 
for the forecast. As we can see, until 2002, actual consumption is 
entirely within, what is a relatively narrow, forecast region. This 
confirms that housing wealth data is of no use in forecasting or 
explaining the level of private consumption in Ireland. The level of 
consumption as it changes through time is explained almost entirely 
by movements in Personal Disposable Income. Even the 
consumption boom that occurred in the late 1990s and was 
coincident with a house price boom appears to have been entirely 
due to the dramatic rise in real personal incomes. Housing wealth 
appears to have had no effect.  
 
 The results of the model indicate that the increase in real personal 
disposable income explains the rise in real personal consumption 
and the addition of the housing wealth series does not provide any 
extra explanatory power. The implication is that the recent increase 
in housing wealth has not been used to fund personal consumption. 
In essence, the growth in real incomes caused both the increase in 
consumption and house prices. In theory this would imply that 
households in Ireland did not believe that the boom in house prices 
was a permanent addition to their wealth. However, this explanation 
is hard to believe given the duration and the extent of the housing 
boom within the Irish market.  
5. 
 Conclusions 
 
Another possible explanation is that Irish households faced 
liquidity and credit constraints and were unable to access the 
positive equity that had begun to accumulate. Anecdotal evidence 
would indicate that the availability of mortgage equity withdrawal 
has only become more widespread in Ireland in recent years, while it 
has been a common feature of the UK housing market for 15 years 
or more. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence would suggest that the 
vast bulk of any equity withdrawal that has occurred in the Irish 
market has been used for residential investment purposes (e.g. 
providing house deposits for children, extensions to existing 
properties etc.) rather than for personal consumption purposes.10 
Unfortunately, data are not published in Ireland that can identify the 
use of mortgage equity withdrawal and therefore it is difficult to be 
precise about its influence. Our suspicion, based on the anecdotal 
evidence, is that the latter of these reasons explains why the increase 
in housing wealth has not influenced personal consumption over 
the period under review. Further research is clearly required to 
confirm this. 
 
In the short term, households may well alter their consumption 
and saving patterns if house prices fall but theory suggests that only 
a permanent fall in house prices will have a long lasting impact on 
consumption. Another caveat is that negative equity should only 
 
10 McCarthy and Steindel (2007) suggest that this is true for the US also. 
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become a binding constraint on consumption if the servicing costs 
of the mortgage rise significantly and impact on household’s 
personal disposable incomes. Initially, if house prices fell this would 
hit consumer confidence but over the longer term, if the servicing 
costs are not altered significantly, it should have no long lasting 
impact on consumption. 
 
Furthermore, if households have not used housing wealth for 
personal consumption purposes to date then personal consumption 
would remain unaffected by a fall in house prices. This would imply 
that the recessionary effects of a decline in house prices would not 
be severe. However, this might be a bit simplistic as Engelhardt 
(1996) found that there is an asymmetry in the consumption and 
saving behaviour of households and that consumption reacted more 
when house prices were declining than when prices were rising. We 
found no evidence of such asymmetries in the Irish case. 
 
Finally, it has to be borne in mind, that even if a decline in house 
prices does not affect the economy via the wealth channel examined 
in this paper, it may affect the economy in other ways. Kelly (2007) 
has shown that the Irish economy is unusual in having such a large 
level of housing construction. He suggests that any decline in the 
housing market could have a large negative impact on the overall 
economy via a direct reduction in investment and employment. 
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PRESERVING 
ELECTRICITY MARKET 
EFFICIENCY WHILE 
CLOSING IRELAND’S 
CAPACITY GAP∗ 
Seán Lyons, John Fitz Gerald, Niamh McCarthy, Laura 
Malaguzzi Valeri and Richard S.J. Tol 
 The public perception of electricity regulation focuses on price 
outcomes: are prices low or high, rising or falling, stable or volatile. 
However, the quantity and quality dimensions of electricity services 
also have important effects on societal welfare. Although electricity 
is essentially a homogeneous good, the services that deliver it may 
be differentiated in ways that are significant to users; in particular, 
by the reliability standard they deliver.1 Ideally, we should choose 
the set of market arrangements that will deliver, both now and in 
the future, the preferred quantity and quality of electricity services at 
prices that are as low as possible.    
 
Because electrical energy is costly to store and the lead-time for 
constructing new generation capacity is long in comparison to 
demand fluctuations, the key decisions affecting quantity and quality 
of electricity services are the mix and timing of investment in 
∗We received helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper from an 
anonymous referee, Eleanor Denny, Una Nic Giolla Choille, Bob Hanna, Tanya 
Harrington, Fergal McNamara, Éanna O’Conghaile, Donagh O’Mahony, Iain 
Osborne and Paul Smith. Funding by the Energy Policy Research Centre of The 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) is gratefully acknowledged.  
Corresponding author:  seán.lyons@esri.ie   
 
1 Consumers may also differentiate electricity by its source (e.g., carbon-neutral, 
non-nuclear) but that is not the focus of this paper. 
different types of generating plants. The system should have an 
optimal mix of generating plants available to meet demand 
fluctuations without excessive risk of outages, and capacity should 
evolve over time in line with demand growth, all at the lowest 
practicable cost while maintaining incentives to invest. 
 
In past decades, both the evaluation of appropriate capacity 
levels and the formulation of the best response to it would have 
been accomplished through central planning mechanisms (Fitz 
Gerald et al., 2005, p.57). The central planner would specify a level 
of capacity (for example, by calculating expected demand plus a 
reserve margin) thought sufficient to meet a defined standard for 
system reliability. 
 
In contrast, a core premise of the new All-Island Market2 is that 
the regulators should put a mechanism in place that will allow 
market forces to ensure that adequate capacity is built in an efficient 
and timely manner. Use of markets, rather than central planning, to 
deliver the required level of capacity has important advantages; in 
particular, it should help improve efficiency and lower prices in the 
long run. However, it also presents challenges for policymakers. 
Rather than the central planner setting capacity by fiat, investors 
must be given incentives to build the right sorts of generating plants 
at the right times and ensure they are available to generate power 
when needed. 
 
The market’s designers have gone to some lengths to create 
appropriate investment incentives for this purpose. Delivered 
through a system of administrative “capacity payments”, the essence 
of these incentives is to increase certainty of revenues and allow 
generators who make plant available at times when capacity margins 
are relatively tight to earn revenues in such periods that are higher, 
and in some cases considerably higher, than their short-run costs. 
The expectation of additional payments at times of scarcity is 
intended to provide a signal for market participants to ensure that 
additional capacity is made available when it is required. The overall 
level of capacity payments is derived administratively from estimates 
of the tightness of the market and the cost of new peaking capacity.3 
 
The performance of such a mechanism in practice depends 
crucially upon how market participants respond to the incentives it 
provides. Theory and international regulatory experience emphasise 
 
2 The All-Island market is a single electricity market covering Northern Ireland and 
the Republic of Ireland, and it is scheduled to go live in November 2007. 
3 Peaking plants display a relatively high variable cost of electricity generation, but 
fairly low fixed costs. Additionally, they may be switched on and off frequently 
without excessive cost. Plants suited to such intra-day switching are used to meet 
demand fluctuations efficiently. On the other hand, base load plants, with relatively 
high fixed and low variable costs, are optimised for use in a relatively continuous 
way. Mid-merit plants fall somewhere in between: ideally they produce for several 
hours, but can be shut down and restarted daily. 
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the role of credibility as a necessary condition for enabling 
investment incentives to operate effectively. By credibility, we mean 
that the state must be in a position to pre-commit that it will not 
change the rules of the game once irreversible investments are in 
place. If this sort of credibility is lacking, the market may be subject 
to under-investment (Blackmon and Zeckhauser, 1992).4 
 
This is not merely a theoretical point. Continued increases in 
demand and planned retirement of old plant imply that significant 
new electricity generation capacity will be needed over the next 
seven years (Eirgrid, 2006). Figure 1 below illustrates the extent of 
future requirements for the All-Island market.  
 Figure 1: Electricity Generation Capacity in the All-Island Market 
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Sources: ESRI analysis of generation and transmission adequacy reports published 
by the System Operator for Northern Ireland and Eirgrid. 
 
Note that the white “New” segment at the top of the chart 
grows rapidly from 2011 onwards. This represents incremental 
capacity that will be required to maintain the 2006 level of supply 
adequacy, allowing for expected demand growth, increases in wind 
power supply and current plans for plant retirements and 
introductions. 
 
Indeed, capacity margins are already relatively tight. Forced 
outages5 among a small number of ageing generation units could 
sharply increase the risk of shortages if they were to coincide with 
peak winter demand (Malaguzzi Valeri and Tol, 2006).  
 
 
4 Hold-up problems such as this have been studied extensively in the contracts 
theory literature. See Schmitz (2001) for a recent survey. 
5 An unscheduled event, such as a technical failure, during which a plant is unable 
to make all or part of its planned capacity available to the market. 
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In this paper, we first describe the institutional arrangements 
used in the SEM to provide capacity incentives and discuss the role 
of credibility in allowing the market to work. We then examine three 
important influences on investors’ incentives. First, we use a static 
model of the Single Electricity Market (SEM) to identify the signals 
the new market will send investors as to the types of generating 
plant that should be built. Second, we consider the effects of likely 
future developments in the market, in particular the rapid increase 
in wind generating capacity. Finally, we analyse some of the sources 
of risk faced by investors in generating plants, and we suggest that 
there are important differences in the incidence of the main sources 
of risk across plant types. 
 
Our static comparison provides ambiguous results as to which 
sorts of plant should be most attractive to investors. Plant 
profitability in a relatively small market is likely to be cyclical due to 
the relatively large size of new plants in comparison to the total 
market. The growing importance of wind generation in the SEM 
suggests that the system will need more mid-merit and peaking 
capacity to help meet system reliability goals in future. We also note 
that plant retirements planned by the ESB in the next few years are 
concentrated in the mid-merit segment. Furthermore, peaking and 
mid-merit plants trading in the SEM should face significantly lower 
economic, market and credit risks than those faced by base load 
plants. However, plants that rely heavily on capacity payments are 
likely to face higher exposure to political and regulatory risk. If such 
risks are seen as significant, this could have the effect of distorting 
investors’ choices as to which sorts of plant to build, as well as how 
much investment to commit. 
 
To ensure that there is sufficient investment to meet Ireland’s 
capacity needs and to allow the market to deliver an optimal 
portfolio of plant types, the SEM must be credible. The third 
section of the paper refers to direct government intervention in 
electricity capacity. Recent announcements suggest that this may 
continue in parallel with the development of the SEM. Such 
intervention could lead to problems in establishing credibility for 
the new market. 
 
In the final section, we outline some ways in which the Irish 
government might support regulatory credibility, increasing societal 
welfare in the long term. 
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In their design for the new SEM, Ireland’s two regulators6 have 
chosen a mechanism that should allow the market to determine 
when, where and by whom new generation capacity will be built. 
The model is not completely devoid of state intervention, as 
discussed below. However, the logic of this approach is that 
markets will be better than central planning at building and 
maintaining generating assets that deliver adequate capacity at least 
cost. In this section, we discuss the features within the SEM that are 
intended to ensure that adequate capacity is supplied by the market. 
While this system may be the best option for Ireland, it presents 
considerable challenges, especially in the establishment and 
maintenance of regulatory credibility. 
1. 
Incentives to 
Supply 
Adequate 
Electricity 
Generation 
INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES FOR ENSURING THERE IS 
ADEQUATE CAPACITY 
The SEM is an “integrated” market, by which we mean that all 
physical trading of energy is done through a mandatory pool, and it 
incorporates a capacity payments mechanism. This type of 
mechanism provides an administratively determined payment for 
each unit of generating capacity that is made available. Paid for by 
electricity users, these payments are intended to offset some of the 
fixed costs of generation, encouraging market participants to offer 
an efficient level of capacity despite the (parallel) imposition of 
limitations on wholesale prices.7 In the SEM the total annual pot of 
capacity payments is determined in the autumn and is fixed for one 
calendar year. The pot of capacity payments depends broadly on 
how tight the market is and on the annual cost of running a best-
new-entrant peaking plant. Both these measures are revised once a 
year. 
 
Several alternative market-based mechanisms are used 
internationally to provide efficient incentives for supply of electricity 
generation capacity; De Vries (2007), includes a useful discussion of 
them. We draw upon his analysis when summarising the main types 
below: 
 
Energy-only markets allow wholesale prices to vary freely. 
Periods of scarcity are likely to lead to very high prices, which 
should act as a signal for potential entrants. However, few 
jurisdictions are willing to tolerate such extreme price volatility, and 
the combination of energy-only pricing with price cap measures is 
likely to lead to under-investment in capacity.8 Moreover, payoffs to 
investors in such a market are likely to be highly dependent on 
 
6 The Commission for Energy Regulation in the Republic of Ireland and the 
Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation. 
7 In the SEM, prices are limited through bidding principles. 
8 System reliability is thought to have public good characteristics, which implies 
that it would likely be under-supplied in the absence of state intervention (Joskow, 
2006, p.8). 
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prices in a few peak hours each year, and these are likely to be 
difficult to forecast. 
 
Strategic Reserve measures take a portion of capacity out of 
the market and earmark it for use by the system operator when 
reserve margins are tight. Their effectiveness depends upon the 
assumptions that the market will replace the assets placed in the 
strategic reserve and that a central planner can correctly identify the 
optimal size of the reserve and price at which it should be 
dispatched. 
 
Operating Reserves Pricing places a similar informational 
burden on the system operator. In this mechanism, a volume of 
reserve capacity is purchased in daily auctions, alongside normal 
operating requirements. Because of the long lead time in building 
electricity plants, this mechanism may also be vulnerable to 
investment cycles, as prices signalling scarcity lead to excess entry, 
followed by periods of underinvestment when prices signal that 
capacity is adequate. 
 
Capacity Requirements and related models focus on the volume 
of capacity rather than its price as in the models we have discussed 
thus far. Either the system operator or electricity customers 
(including retail electricity companies and large users) are required 
to buy sufficient capacity commitments forward to meet expected 
demand.9 The certainty provided by these forward purchases is 
intended to provide an incentive for efficient investment. These 
models have some attractive theoretical properties, but they rely on 
the presence of effective competition in the supply of capacity.10 In 
a small and concentrated market such as the SEM, a forward 
capacity auction might be vulnerable to exercise of market power by 
the largest players.11 
 
Although a capacity payments system is probably the most 
appropriate mechanism for Ireland at present, given that the ESB 
retains significant market power,12 it is important to recognise some 
of its potential shortcomings. First, the system places an important 
component of price setting in regulators’ hands. The level of these 
capacity payments is based on administrative estimates of the cost 
of building and maintaining a peaking plant. The incentive 
properties and the credibility of the SEM are thus dependent upon 
 
9 Some variants, such as reliability contract models, employ call options rather than 
forward purchases of capacity. See e.g., De Vries (2007), pp. 27-29. 
10 De Vries (2007) notes that international trade in electricity would erode many of 
the advantages of a system of capacity payments; because of limited and de facto 
unidirectional interconnection, this problem does not hold for Ireland. 
11 See Malaguzzi Valeri (2006) p. 9, for a discussion of capacity market power 
problems that have arisen in the PJM system in the United States. 
12 If structural change leads to strengthened competition in the future, this would 
improve the case for using some form of forward capacity market. 
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the regulator’s ability to set an appropriate level of capacity 
payments. 
 
Identifying the right level of capacity payments is not easy, and 
the information provided by market participants on this issue is 
likely to be one-sided. Both entrants and incumbents have a 
common interest in arguing for a formula that will provide the 
highest possible level of payments. Electricity users would prefer 
the payments (and hence retail prices) to be lower for a given level 
of capacity, but electricity users do not tend to respond to 
regulatory consultations. 
REGULATORY CREDIBILITY AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 
OF GENERATION ASSETS 
There is a second and less direct, but equally important, way in 
which government actions may affect the capacity payments 
mechanism. The Irish government retains an influence over a 
significant proportion of existing capacity through its ownership of 
the ESB. Public ownership of the largest electricity generation 
company may give rise to a temptation towards direct intervention 
in the market. This is partly because the transaction costs associated 
with direct intervention (e.g. through influence over investment or 
pricing decisions) may be lower, or more importantly may be 
perceived to be lower, when the state owns a generator than when it 
does not. 
 
Why might a government wish to intervene in this way? There 
are many reasons, but two of the main ones are because the state 
has a direct stake in the success of the enterprise through the value 
of its shareholding (which for example might be slated for eventual 
privatisation), and the government may have conflicting objectives 
such as maintaining peaceful industrial relations in the short run and 
maximising long-run consumer welfare. Even if no direct 
intervention is intended, the government faces an additional hurdle 
when trying to signal to the markets that it will allow the market to 
operate without interference (Willig, 1994, pp.157-158; Boycko et al., 
1996, p. 318). 
 
One advantage the SEM possesses when trying to establish 
credibility is its cross-border dimension. Establishing the market on 
foot of arrangements agreed between two governments and two 
regulators should make it more difficult for any one party to change 
the rules for short-term gain. Changing such an arrangement 
probably involves higher transaction costs than altering the rules 
within a single jurisdiction. In a related move, the Irish government 
recently removed issues affecting the SEM from the set of areas on 
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which the Minister may give policy directions to the CER.13 This 
change should also serve to increase the credibility of policy related 
to the market. 
 
In parallel with the development of the SEM, the Commission 
for Energy Regulation (CER) has announced that structural reforms 
will be undertaken to improve the effectiveness of competition. 
Many previous studies have considered models for reducing the 
ESB’s market power in generation by requiring the sale of some of 
its generating assets (recent contributions include Deloitte & 
Touche, 2005; McCarthy, 2005, and IPA Consulting et al., 2001). In 
practice, structural change seems likely to rely not on a regulatory 
mandate, but on an agreement between the ESB and the CER that 
the firm will divest up to 30 per cent of its generation capacity 
before 2010 (CER, 2007).  
 
The recent Energy White Paper also indicates that the 
government will switch the ownership of transmission assets from 
the ESB to Eirgrid as a means of “…enhancing competition and 
transparency and reducing costs” (DCMNR, 2007b, p.48). Such 
structural changes should reinforce regulatory credibility and 
strengthen competition in two ways. First, ownership of 
transmission assets by the generating company could encourage an 
external perception that that there may be an incentive for subtle 
forms of qualitative favouritism between the two companies. 
Transfer of the assets should help remove any such perception. 
Although conduct regulation is used to prevent favouritism of this 
kind, the point of structural regulation is to limit the need for 
conduct regulation while controlling the exercise of market power. 
Second, to the extent that different levels of risk are associated with 
the transmission and generation businesses, borrowing costs based 
on pooled assets could facilitate implicit cross-subsidies to the 
higher risk business. Transfer of the assets (together with associated 
debt), should also eliminate this possibility. 
 
The SEM needs to build credibility in order to operate efficiently 
in the long term, and this task is made more difficult by the absence 
of a track record for the market, the administrative challenges of 
setting capacity payments and the scale of state involvement in 
electricity generation. It may be helped by the pre-commitment 
associated with its cross-border dimension and by actions taken to 
reduce concentration and facilitate effective competition. 
 
 
 
13 Ministerial policy directions are permitted under Section 7 of the Energy 
Regulation Act 1999; the amendment was made in Section 11(d) of the Electricity 
Regulation (Amendment) (Single Electricity Market) Act 2007. 
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We have earlier noted that Ireland faces a capacity deficit in the 
medium term. If the SEM performs as designed, it should eliminate 
this deficit by providing incentives for entry through the signal of 
high capacity payments at times when the system is under stress. In 
this section, we ask what sort of plant the SEM’s incentives might 
be expected to attract.  
2. 
Investment 
Signals from 
the SEM
MODELLING OF CAPACITY INVESTMENT OPTIONS 
We start with a static comparison of alternative plant types, using a 
model of economic dispatch for the SEM. This is not intended to 
be a full project appraisal of the various options, but rather to focus 
on the main features of the investment decision. The cost of fuel 
used (at 2006 prices),14 an estimate of O&M costs and the capital 
employed by each sort of plant are all taken into account.15 Carbon 
prices are assumed to be zero. Plants earn revenue from sales of 
energy to the market and from capacity payments.16 Capacity 
payments have been distributed across the available plant using 
broad assumptions on availability and assuming no forced outages. 
 
The Irish government has ambitious targets for the share of 
electricity to be provided by renewable sources in the coming years. 
On present trends, it seems possible that the market will meet or 
exceed these targets, principally through the construction of wind 
generation capacity.17 Increases in the use of wind generation are 
included in our modelling, based on projections in Eirgrid (2006).   
 
We have estimated the model for two capacity scenarios: one 
representing the set of generating plants expected to be available at 
the start of 2008 and the other as at the end of 2011. We provide 
more details of the two scenarios below, but the main differences 
between them relate to the introduction of two new CCGTs, a 
substantial increase in the amount of wind capacity and planned 
retirements of other plants by the ESB.  
 
For each scenario, we calculate the short-run return on capital 
employed (ROCE) by subtracting fuel and O&M costs from total 
revenue, including capacity payments, and dividing the result by the 
capital employed.18 This assumption allows us to make a static 
comparison between plant types, but it means we are not allowing 
 
14 Prices were based on IEA averages for the first three quarters of 2006. 
15 However, we abstract from ancillary services and the costs of start-up and 
ramping up and down generators. 
16 We assume plants bid at fuel cost. This leads to conservative estimates of energy 
prices, since bids are likely to cover at least some other variable costs. 
17 However, there is also a renewables target for all energy use. Renewables are 
relatively more expensive in other forms of energy use, particularly transport, so 
power generation may need to considerably exceed its own target. 
18 Total revenue includes revenue from sales of energy and capacity payments, but 
omits ancillary services. The inframarginal rent component is also excluded from 
capacity payments, because it is not clear how it will be applied in the future. 
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for effects on a plant’s profitability of subsequent entry to the 
market. As we shall see later, such dynamic effects may change this 
static picture considerably. 
 
Table A below summarises our results for the 2008 scenario. 
The table compares the return on capital employed that would be 
earned by a marginal (10MW) new investment in a gas fired 
CCGT,19 which is suited to base load generation, compared to a 
similar investment in a gas fired OCGT,20 which is better suited to 
mid-merit or peaking operation.21 This small increment to capacity 
is employed as a simplifying device to assist comparison of plant 
types, abstracting from the “lumpiness” of generation investments. 
In practice, generation investments have a much higher minimum 
efficient scale.22 To provide additional context, the results include 
estimates of return on capital for existing peaking plant and the 
(base load) Moneypoint coal plant. For the latter, we provide 
estimates both at historic cost23 and assumed replacement cost.  
Table A: Marginal Profitability of Different Plant Types under the SEM – 2008 Scenario 
      
Plant Type Plant Size Utilisation 
Rate 
Surplus over 
Operating 
Costs 
Capital 
Employed 
Return on Capital 
Employed  
(year 1) 
 MW % €m €m % 
New Marginal CCGT  10 91.00 0.614 7.03 8.7 
New Marginal OCGT 10 8.20 0.228 4.74 4.8 
Existing Peaker 52 0.23 1.670 20.00 8.4 
Moneypoint historic 284 91.00 90.400 120.00 75.3 
Moneypoint 
replacement 284 91.00 90.400 200.00 45.2 
      
 
In the 2008 scenario, system capacity is relatively tight and we 
estimate the time-weighted average price to be about €64 per MWh. 
CCGTs have been popular among actual and potential entrants in 
the past. Under our assumptions, a marginal investment in CCGT 
capacity would make a return of 8.7 per cent. This figure is slightly 
higher than the assumed “Best New Entrant” (BNE) cost of capital 
(7.83 per cent),24 but it important to note that the returns shown in 
this table do not include likely revenue from sources omitted from 
our analysis (ancillary services revenue, the inframarginal rents 
element of capacity payments, ancillary services revenue and any 
element of O&M costs included in energy bids). In practice, the full 
 
19 Combined-cycle gas turbine. 
20 Open-cycle gas turbine. 
21 Recently the regulatory authorities of the SEM have decided that for technical 
reasons the theoretical best-new-entrant peaking plant will run on distillate oil and 
not gas (All Island Project, 2007). However, this does not affect our analysis. 
22 For example, a new CCGT would normally generate about 400MW per hour. 
23 We take the €368 million cost of installing flue gas desulphurisation at 
Moneypoint as the capital value for the historic cost analysis. 
24 All Island Project, 2007, p. 21. 
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expected return for each plant type should therefore be higher than 
our estimates.  
 
Moneypoint does better than a marginal CCGT, due to a 
combination of its low cost fuel (coal), zero assumed price of 
carbon and the use of historic cost in valuing its capital employed. 
The use of replacement cost would reduce Moneypoint’s estimated 
return on capital, but we find that the plant would still make a 
substantial return if the treatment were changed to replacement 
cost. A change in the price of carbon could adversely affect 
Moneypoint’s profitability; however, given 2006 fuel prices, 
Moneypoint would still be dispatched unless carbon prices climbed 
to over €50 per tonne.  
 
Because the capacity payments system is designed to allow an 
efficient OCGT to make a normal return, we might expect that an 
incremental investment in this type of plant would receive net 
revenue close to its required cost of capital. However, as noted 
above, the returns shown in Table A cannot be directly compared to 
the BNE cost of capital. We carried out a simple off-model analysis 
that suggests the apparent shortfall for this plant type compared to 
the BNE cost of capital is approximately equal to likely revenue 
from sources not included in our model. 
 
It is important to note that in this scenario the level of demand 
is high relative to the level of generating capacity in the market. 
Such scarcity conditions should have a pronounced effect on 
peakers, which run for more hours than they would if a substantial 
capacity margin were available. Therefore, the market should (and 
our model suggests, would) pay oil-fired peaking plants significantly 
more than their cost of capital under our 2008 assumptions.  
 
Our second static scenario moves the clock forward to 2011 (see 
Table B below). By this time, we assume, all plant scheduled for 
withdrawal from the market in Eirgrid’s 2007-2013 Generation 
Adequacy report will have gone. These withdrawals account for 
over 1,000MW of capacity assumed to be operating in 2007.25 In 
addition, we assume that two new 400MW CCGT plants approved 
for construction by ESB and Bord Gais will have entered the 
market, along with an additional 1,000MW of wind generation 
capacity. Annual demand growth is included at the average of the 
high and low predictions given in the ESRI Medium-Term Review. 
 
By 2011, the net effect of generation construction and 
withdrawals is to substantially widen the margin of available 
generation over demand. The time-weighted average price is 
predicted to fall to about €58 per MWh (from €64 on the 2008 
scenario). 
 
25 Great Island is assumed to have closed prior to the 2008 scenario, and steam 
capacity from Tarbert and Poolbeg is assumed to be closed by 2011. 
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Table B: Marginal Profitability of Different Plant Types under the SEM – 2011 Scenario 
      
Plant Type Plant Size Utilisation 
Rate 
Surplus over 
Operating Costs 
Capital 
Employed 
Return on 
Capital 
Employed 
(year 1) 
 MW % €m €m % 
New Marginal CCGT  10 79.0 0.135 7.03 1.9 
New Marginal OCGT 10 4.5 0.116 4.74 2.4 
Existing Peaker 52 0.0 1.390 20.00 7.0 
Moneypoint historic 284 91.0 77.600 120.00 64.7 
Moneypoint      
replacement 284 91.0 77.600 200.00 38.8 
      
 
The resulting decrease in the profitability of generation affects all 
plants to some extent, but the predicted impact is relatively limited 
for plants towards the bottom or top of the merit order. The results 
reported above for Moneypoint and existing peakers are 
qualitatively similar to those reported above for 2008. 
 
However, the withdrawal of expensive26 mid-merit capacity and 
its replacement by substantial new wind and CCGT capacity has the 
effect of reducing the predicted ROCE of a new marginal CCGT 
investment by about 7 percentage points (from 8.7 per cent to 1.9 
per cent). The returns on a marginal investment in OCGT capacity 
fall too, but by less than 3 percentage points (from 4.8 per cent to 
2.4 per cent). 
 
The changing relative fortunes of these two plant types appear to 
reflect the shift in the SEM’s plant portfolio away from mid-merit 
and towards wind and base load capacity. While the utilisation of an 
incremental OCGT is reduced compared to the 2008 scenario, 
falling from 8.2 per cent to 4.5 per cent, this change is modest 
compared to the fall in utilisation of an incremental CCGT (from 91 
per cent, which is the maximum level allowed in the model, to 79 
per cent). Indeed, older CCGTs are affected still more adversely by 
the increase in total capacity and changes in the plant portfolio. For 
example, the 2011 simulation shows Huntstown 1 and Dublin 
Bay/Synergen running at about half capacity. 
 
Comparing the 2008 and 2011 scenarios illustrates three key 
points about the SEM. First, plant profitability in a relatively small 
market is likely to be cyclical. Since increments to capacity tend to 
be relatively large compared to the size of the market, new plants 
will tend to depress profitability when they are first brought on 
stream, at least until demand has time to catch up with the new 
capacity level. Given that new investment to date has focused on 
CCGTs, the profitability of older (invariably less efficient) CCGTs 
is most affected by such increments. 
 
 
26 In the sense of high marginal cost. 
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Second, the unprecedented rise of wind generation, if it 
continues, seems likely to put pressure on the profitability of 
CCGTs. This, combined with firm plans for two new CCGTs, 
suggests that the SEM may be oversupplied with base load capacity 
in the medium term. Some plants may even be pushed towards the 
limits of their cycling ability.27 However, it is not clear whether the 
rate of growth in wind generation capacity can or will be maintained 
at this level. 
 
Finally, investments in peaking and mid-merit capacity are likely 
to be less acutely affected by these changes in the SEM’s capacity 
level and mix. Coal generation will remain profitable unless there is 
a substantial increase in the carbon price, together with a fall in the 
relative price of gas to coal. 
EFFECTS OF INCREASING THE SHARE OF 
RENEWABLES IN GENERATION 
Beyond the effects we have modelled, the rising share of wind 
generation has further implications for the maintenance of adequate 
capacity and for the relative attractiveness of other types of plants 
on the system. 
 
Because the short- to medium-term availability of electricity 
generated from wind is constrained by weather conditions, wind 
plants normally require commitment of other types of plants as 
backup. In effect, if wind levels drop but demand remains high, 
other generation assets must be available to take up the slack, 
sometimes in a relatively short time.  
 
Peaking and mid-merit plants such as OCGTs are generally 
better suited to a reserve role than CCGTs. As the share of wind on 
the system rises, the efficient mix of plants should thus also include 
a rising share of peaking and mid-merit plants relative to base load 
capacity.28 The new SEM should facilitate this, because the demand 
for generation capacity net of wind power should become more volatile 
as the share of wind generation rises. This provides an additional 
reason that investment in mid-merit and peaking plant should be 
increasingly attractive over time. The modelling results given above 
do not include back-up requirements for wind power, so they are 
likely to underestimate the relative attractiveness of OCGTs. 
 
 
 
 
27 Switching on and off by a plant is known as cycling. Technical and commercial 
parameters limit the amount of cycling that is practical for a given type of plant; 
e.g. if CCGTs cycle too much they may emit excessive levels of NOx. 
28 However, the relationship is not necessarily equi-proportionate, since the output 
from wind plants in different parts of the country is not perfectly correlated. 
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IMPACT OF DIFFERING RISK PROFILES ACROSS PLANT 
TYPES  
The optimal choice of technology for a new plant is sensitive to 
several uncertain parameters. Some of these parameters are largely 
exogenous, such as prices of carbon and various fuels. Others are 
endogenous, such as the extent, type and timing of competing plant 
entry. Up to now, we have assumed that investors can be certain 
about the payoffs from generation investments, given expected 
market structure and demand. In the remainder of this section we 
relax this assumption. 
 
In particular, how does the exposure of each plant type to 
various sources of risk affect its attractiveness as an investment? 
The main risks associated with a new plant investment can be 
categorised between market and economic risks (e.g. fuel prices, 
demand growth and volatility, interest rates, labour costs, carbon 
prices); operational risks (achievable availability levels, unplanned 
outages); credit risks (depending upon contractual arrangements 
with energy customers) and political/regulatory risks (stability of the 
capacity payments system, changes to the Best New Entrant cost 
assumptions).  
 
To the extent that there are significant differences among the 
risk profiles of plant types, changes in the perceived magnitude of 
particular sources of risks may alter different plant types’ relative 
attractiveness. 
 
Given the design of the SEM, base load (e.g. CCGT) investment 
is likely to be more exposed to market, economic, operational and 
credit risk, whereas mid-merit or peaking plant investment is more 
exposed to political and regulatory risk. 
 
To see why, note that each plant type derives its revenue from 
two sources: sales of energy through the electricity pool and 
administrative capacity payments, but the relative importance of 
these two sources varies by plant type. Table C below shows the 
share of total revenue each plant type is expected to earn from 
capacity payments, based on our modelling results with (as before) 
the expected population of generating plants in 2007 and 2011. 
Table C: Regulatory Risk Profiles of Different Plant Types under the SEM 
      
 Scenario Plant Size Total 
Revenue 
Capacity 
Payments 
Revenue 
Share of Revenue 
from Capacity 
Payments 
  MW €m €m % 
Marginal CCGT  2008 10 5.50 0.500 8.9 
 2011 10 4.40 0.400 9.8 
Marginal OCGT 2008 10 1.20 0.500 42.0 
 2011 10 0.80 0.400 55.0 
Existing Peaker 2008 52 2.70 2.500 93.7 
 2011 52 2.30 2.300 100.0 
Moneypoint 2008 284 152.90 13.800 9.1 
 2011 284 142.40 15.100 8.8 
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A new CCGT is expected to earn over 90 per cent of its revenue 
from sales of electricity under the SEM. Generating this energy 
requires fuel and carbon inputs, an are reduced to the extent that 
unplanned outages occur or the plant is otherwise unavailable. 
Credit risk could arise if the plant’s output is sold through long-term 
contracts. Thus a plant of this type has significant exposure to 
economic, market, operational and credit risks. In contrast, a 
peaking plant runs only rarely and uses little fuel (and emits little 
carbon). Because peakers run much less frequently than other 
plants, they may also be less vulnerable to operational risks. An 
unplanned outage would be costly for such a plant if it occurred at a 
time when the plant would have been dispatched (when prices are 
high), but if the risk of such breakdowns is more evenly distributed 
over time periods, the plant’s revenues should be less vulnerable to 
unplanned outages than those of plants that run more continuously. 
 
If these were the only risks faced by a plant investment, peaking 
and mid-merit investments should be more appealing than base load 
investments if expected rates of return for the former were at least 
as high and investors were risk averse. 
 
However, the incidence of political and regulatory risk is 
probably quite different from the risk types discussed so far. In the 
SEM, the level of capacity payments seems more acutely exposed to 
political and regulatory decisions than energy revenues are. Through 
the bidding principles, energy revenues will be limited to a level 
associated with the variable costs of a marginal plant, and it is hard 
to see how a regulator could reduce them significantly from such 
levels. Maintenance of the capacity payments regime, in contrast, 
relies on political support and on the credibility of administrative 
decisions about quite technical parameters, in particular 
assumptions about Best New Entrant costs.  
 
Base load plants like CCGTs and Moneypoint, which in any 
scenario earn most of their revenues from energy, would be least 
affected (in relative terms) if capacity payments were to change. A 
marginal investment in OCGT capacity would feel a substantially 
stronger effect from changes in capacity payments, with about half 
of its revenues depending upon the mechanism. Peakers earn almost 
all of their revenues from capacity payments when there is adequate 
capacity, but even when capacity is tight (as in our 2008 scenario), 
the vast majority of their revenues still come from this source. 
 
If the governments or regulators were to intervene in a way that 
removed or reduced capacity payments after an investor had already 
built a plant, some of the revenues the investor expected might not 
materialise. Actual returns would then be lower than those expected 
at the time of investment. If this risk is material, investors will take 
it into account when deciding whether, how much and what type of 
investment to commit. 
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Taken together, our results on investment incentives suggest that 
the SEM design will deliver rates of return on new generating 
capacity that should be sufficient to attract new entry, provided the 
market arrangements are seen as credible. The mix of plant that it 
favours is less clear, depending partly on dynamic factors we have 
not modelled fully here and partly on the strength of regulatory 
credibility that accompanies it. 
 
In the next section we discuss a second strand of government 
policy towards electricity market capacity that may also have 
implications for regulatory credibility and the future development of 
electricity generation capacity. 
 
 To achieve the best long-run outcome, the SEM’s regulators need 
to ensure that the capacity mechanism accommodates a set of 
strategies by all players (incumbents, entrants, government) that will 
lead to the highest possible societal welfare. These strategies must 
also be incentive-compatible for each participant. For example, if 
the mechanism was designed to deliver too little capacity and 
shortages would result, it would not be credible to assume that 
government would refrain from intervention. 
3. 
Direct State 
Intervention in 
Electricity 
Capacity 
 
Although the SEM includes mechanisms that should bring 
electricity capacity into line with demand, recent policy 
developments might be interpreted as suggesting a lack of 
confidence in its speed or efficacy. As we will discuss in the next 
section, the government and regulators may wish to take actions to 
counter this impression and thereby reinforce the credibility of the 
SEM. 
 
Our main source of concern is the Irish government’s apparent 
intention to establish a new parallel capacity acquisition mechanism. 
In the recent White Paper, the government sets out seven steps it 
will take to “[ensure] that generation adequacy margins are 
improved….” Some of these steps are complementary to the SEM, 
including actions to improve provision of information and site 
availability. However, two steps may be read as alternatives to the 
SEM, or at least to anticipate its possible failure to deliver adequate 
capacity: 
 
• CER and EirGrid to facilitate and oversee the competitive 
provision of additional mid-merit/flexible generating plant of at 
least 240MW over the next 12-18 months to address demand 
and capacity constraints in the immediate term. This will also 
contribute to a more balanced power generation portfolio in 
support of competition and the growth of wind energy on the 
system; 
• EirGrid and CER to plan for the undertaking of a fast build 
option over the next 12 months should this be warranted for 
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generation security of supply reasons and the ownership and 
operation of such plant will be awarded by competitive tender.29 
 
While no further details of these planned initiatives were 
provided, one gets the impression that the government is 
contemplating a second capacity-setting mechanism to operate 
alongside the SEM. From the wording used in the White Paper, this 
might involve construction of a strategic reserve (an option 
mentioned earlier in this paper).  
 
Whether or not the parallel mechanism is intended to be a 
strategic reserve or some other way of boosting system capacity, the 
possibility that it will be employed is likely to affect investor 
behaviour under the SEM. In particular, investors will place less 
confidence in the likely future returns available through the SEM if 
they believe that government might construct alternative capacity, 
particularly if it is to be remunerated through some separate 
mechanism.  
 
Suppose, for example, that the new mechanism involved 
building a significant amount of mid-merit or peaking capacity 
through a tender process and dispatching these plants outside the 
SEM (e.g. by the system operator, as in some strategic reserve 
systems). This could significantly lower the volatility of residual 
demand for those in the SEM and thereby affect the distribution of 
capacity payments available through it. Once the new mechanism 
was in place, the government might also be tempted to put 
downward pressure on the sum of money made available through 
the capacity payments mechanism, since the capacity problem 
would have been “solved”. 
 
We do not suggest that this is what the government actually 
intends to do, but leaving its intentions unclear poses a significant 
risk to the credibility of the SEM.  
 
A second more general area of concern arises from potential 
uncertainty over how the government views its role as a shareholder 
in the ESB, and in particular whether that role may affect its stance 
towards the SEM capacity mechanism. 
 
We have earlier emphasised that state ownership of significant 
generating assets places an additional “burden of proof” on the 
government as it tries to establish regulatory credibility. A variety of 
measures have been taken that may help address this issue, 
including establishment of an independent regulator, use of a cross-
border basis for the SEM, separation of distribution and generation 
businesses, and encouragement of the ESB to divest generation 
capacity and sites. However, credibility will ultimately depend upon 
 
29 DCMNR (2007b, p. 22). 
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whether the government is perceived to maintain a firm separation 
between its roles as owner of the ESB and regulator of the market. 
Nowhere is this more important than in decisions about 
construction of capacity, where firms are making commitments to 
long-term capital investment. 
 
There is a recent example of how perceptions about the state’s 
two roles may become entangled. In January 2007, the Irish 
government announced that it would permit the ESB to build a new 
power station at Aghada, Co. Cork (DCMNR, 2007a). This move 
was long in preparation, and it may well be justified. As the largest 
generator in the country, it is to be expected that the ESB would 
wish to continue to invest in capacity, and state support for such 
investment may be appropriate as long as the competitive playing 
field is level and the state is investing in the expectation of receiving 
commercial returns.  
 
However, part of the stated rationale for government approval 
of the Aghada investment was to help meet an expected shortfall in 
Ireland’s electricity generation capacity from 2009 (DCMNR, 
2007a). This gives the impression that the government’s decisions as 
shareholder are linked to its actions on capacity (which under the 
SEM should be firm-neutral regulatory matters). Even though this 
particular decision came before activation of the SEM, it might have 
been better for the announcement to emphasise that future capacity 
requirements are expected to be met through the incentives 
provided by the SEM.  
 
 There is a valid choice to be made between a centrally planned 
system and one that relies on market forces to ensure that there is 
adequate electricity capacity. We consider that the broad model 
selected for the SEM is the better choice because the market should 
deliver lower cost supply in the long run, but in principle either 
approach could deliver adequate capacity. 
4. 
Implications 
for Future 
Policy 
 
However, the worst possible outcome would be one in which 
the state intervenes over time to manage capacity levels, and the fact 
of this intervention undermines the credibility required to operate a 
market-based SEM. Lack of competitive investment through the 
SEM would then provide a rationale for continued state 
intervention, leading to a high intervention, low competition 
equilibrium. This might even be worse for electricity users than if 
the system was based on central planning in the first place. 
Additional inducements would probably have to be offered to firms 
providing capacity outside the SEM, and in the presence of barriers 
to entry, the existence of two mechanisms could offer opportunities 
for strategic behaviour by those in the market (e.g. potential 
investors withholding commitments to extract better terms from the 
state). Moreover, capacity payments would still be paid at a level 
intended to attract new investment. 
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Our modelling results suggest that the capacity payments 
mechanism should be able to provide appropriate signals as to the 
timing and nature of required capacity. However, the signals the 
mechanism sends out concerning how much to invest and what 
types of plant to build are highly sensitive to a range of factors, 
including the extent of perceived political and regulatory risk, the 
existing mix of plant in the system (and hence the pattern of 
withdrawals) and the Best New Entrant cost assumptions. 
 
The regulators may wish to consider what measures may be 
available to bolster their perceived commitment to the capacity 
payments mechanism. One option would be to pre-commit to a 
minimum level of capacity payments, or a fixed schedule, for a 
number of years – or at least specify a high hurdle for changing the 
previously announced capacity payments. This could help to reduce 
market uncertainty about expected revenues from this source, 
reducing the perceived risk of mid-merit and peaking plant in 
particular. A related option would be to pre-commit not to change 
the assumptions made about cost of a Best New Entrant plant for a 
specified period of time. As well as reducing regulatory risk during 
the period covered, this would also have the effect of slowing 
revenue reductions that might otherwise accrue due to technological 
change. If a highly efficient new technology were introduced, its 
lower costs would not feed through to capacity payments while the 
control was in place. This measure could transfer significant benefits 
from consumers to producers if technology were to advance rapidly, 
so its effects should be considered carefully before it is applied. 
 
Credibility may be also be adversely affected if government is 
seen as likely to intervene directly when signals for additional 
capacity investment are likely to be strong (i.e. when the risk of 
shortages, and hence levels of capacity payments, are high). We have 
concerns about the Irish government’s apparent intention, 
mentioned in the White Paper, to establish a new parallel capacity 
acquisition mechanism. Little detail about these plans has been 
published to date. If a back-up capacity mechanism is to be 
established, it is vital that the government signal well in advance the 
conditions under which it will be activated and explain how its 
operation will affect those providing capacity through the SEM. 
 
Measures such as these should complement policies directed at 
facilitating effective competition and encouraging demand-side 
responsiveness, with the ultimate goal of delivering adequate 
capacity at least cost.  
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 OWNER-OCCUPIED 
HOUSING COSTS AND 
BIAS IN THE IRISH 
CONSUMER PRICE 
INDEX 
Colm McCarthy*
 
The treatment of owner-occupied housing costs is a recurring problem in the 
construction of consumer price indices, and there are competing methodologies. In 
the most widely-used Irish index, the Payments Approach, which attaches a 
weight to a term involving historical house prices and an interest rate, is used to 
measure these costs. It is argued that this has resulted in a substantial over-
statement of inflation in recent quarters, and that the over-statement will 
continue for some time. The Irish version of Eurostat’s Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices, recently running well below the CPI, is a more reliable guide. 
Few national statistical offices use the Payments Approach, and it is argued that 
the procedure used in Ireland should be reviewed.   
Abstract 
 
 The rate of inflation in consumer prices is an important concern 
of economic policy, but its measurement is not straightforward and 
the construction of real-world price index numbers is beset with 
both conceptual and practical difficulties. Most national statistical 
1. 
Introduction 
 
*School of Economics, University College Dublin. The author would like to thank, 
with the usual disclaimer, Alan Barrett, Peter Neary, Kieran Walsh, Rossa White, 
an anonymous referee, and participants at the April 2007 meeting of the Irish 
Economics Association, for helpful comments. 
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 offices publish several alternative measures, and they can differ 
substantially. There is a tendency for one of the measures to 
predominate, and to be seen as ‘the’ rate of inflation. Where a 
measured inflation rate plays an economic policy role as, for 
example, a monetary policy target, or as the basis for escalator 
clauses in centralised pay deals, the methodology of index 
construction is critical and can have important consequences. A 
principal concern of the extensive technical literature is the accuracy 
of published indices as measures of the cost of living, that is, the 
cost of attaining a fixed living standard as prices of goods and 
services change. 
 
There are well-known sources of potential bias1 in fixed-weight 
indices of consumer prices when they are viewed as measures of the 
cost of living. These include substitution bias, which arises from the 
failure of a fixed-weight index to accommodate consumer response 
to relative price changes, as well as bias due to quality change and 
bias due to the introduction of new goods. Numerous studies 
conclude that published indices often over-state the rate of inflation, 
although some of the possible sources of bias (for example quality 
change) can in principle distort the measure below, as well as above, 
the ‘true’ rate of inflation in the cost of living.  
 
The monthly Irish Consumer Price Index is conceived as a base-
weighted (Laspeyres) index of goods and services prices, and thus it 
is not a cost-of-living index in the sense of Konus (1939), as the 
Central Statistics Office (2003) point out in their methodology note. 
In the terminology of Crawford and Image (2004), it is intended as a 
COGI (cost of goods index), not a COLI (cost of living index), and 
therefore ignores the consumer’s opportunities to substitute as 
relative prices change. The same is true of the Irish and other 
national versions of Eurostat’s HICP (Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices).2 But the most troublesome feature of the Irish 
CPI, and it is argued below the most significant source of potential 
bias, lies in its inclusion of a measure of cost for owner-occupied 
housing. The HICPs for the EU member-states exclude this item 
altogether.   
 
While fixed-weight indices, such as the Irish CPI or the family of 
HICPs for EU member countries, may lack a ready interpretation in 
economic theoretical terms (Afriat (1977) calls them ‘answers 
without questions’), they are the most widely used measures of the 
general price level, of inflation, and as the reference for the 
 
1 The term ‘bias’ is routinely used in the index number literature to denote 
departures in a measured index from some specified conceptual standard. Its use 
here is not meant to connote any intent, or calculation error. 
2 There is thus a potential substitution bias with either index.  Substitution bias in 
the Irish CPI for the period 1985-2001 has recently been studied by Somerville 
(2004) and in the aggregate consumption deflator for an earlier period by Irvine 
and McCarthy (1978). 
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 indexation of social expenditures, pensions, coupons on index-
linked financial instruments and for price escalation in regulated 
industries. Somerville (2004) lists numerous examples where Irish 
CPI data has been invoked in policy discussions about wage 
negotiations and during the annual budget-time reviews of the rates 
of payment under the various social welfare schemes. In early 2006, 
the public debate surrounding the national pay negotiations focused 
exclusively around recent twelve-month rates of change in the All-
Items CPI, and there have been calls during 2007 for upward 
revision of the pay deal in the light of a recent surge in the 12-
month CPI inflation rate. The Irish variant of Eurostat’s HICP, 
recently registering much lower twelve-month inflation rates than 
the CPI, is rarely invoked.  
 
The HICP for Ireland covers a subset of CPI components with 
an aggregate weight totalling 89 per cent of the CPI. The principal 
exclusion is mortgage interest, along with building materials, motor 
taxation and some other small items.3 The treatment of owner-
occupied housing in indices of consumer prices, in either a COGI 
or a COLI framework, has been controversial, and there is no 
uniformity of practice internationally. An extensive recent survey is 
Poole et al. (2005). Following Diewert (2003), there are four 
principal approaches, as follows: 
 
(i) The Acquisitions Approach, which covers only net 
acquisitions by the household sector in the current 
period, and typically attaches a low single-figure weight 
to a contemporaneous house price index. This is similar 
to the approach adopted for other durable goods such 
as automobiles, and in effect ignores the fact that some 
goods are durable, and yield a flow of consumption 
beyond the period of purchase. 
 
(ii) The Payments Approach, of which the Irish CSO’s 
methodology is an example. This attaches a weight, based 
on household spending patterns in a base period, to the 
out-of-pocket expenses incurred by owner-occupiers, 
principally mortgage interest in Ireland. 
 
3The HICPs for all EU countries exclude owner-occupied housing costs altogether 
and, since the Eurozone HICP is the inflation variable monitored by the European 
Central Bank, this exclusion raises the issue of whether and how asset price 
inflation is to be catered for in the target inflation measures used by monetary 
authorities. The EU’s statistical agency, Eurostat, has initiated studies on the issue, 
and some procedure for incorporating owner-occupied housing costs into a revised 
HICP methodology is expected to be agreed in due course. Pilot studies are being 
undertaken in several member-states, and it would appear that some variant of the 
acquisitions basis is the most likely to be chosen, that is, a weight would be 
computed and attached to an index of contemporaneous house prices. 
 
85 
 (iii) The User Cost Approach, which computes end-period 
value less starting value, plus maintenance costs, 
depreciation or taxes during the period. 
 
(iv) Finally the Rental Equivalence Approach computes the 
flow of service to owner-occupiers from data on rental 
levels in the market. This approach, used amongst 
others by the US Bureau of Labour Statistics in 
computing the US CPI, typically attaches a high weight, 
20 per cent or more, to housing.  
 
Of the four approaches, Rental Equivalence fits most easily into 
a true cost-of-living framework, and the US CPI is explicitly 
designed to be a COLI. Theoretical objections to the Payments 
Approach used in Ireland are principally that it includes an asset 
price which does not logically belong in an index measuring 
consumption prices, and that it includes an interest rate term, 
reflecting the cost of credit rather than the price of a good or 
service. On the other hand, the weight attached to the term is often 
small, and the potential impact on the overall CPI might be felt to 
be immaterial. We will argue below that this is a misperception, and 
that there can be circumstances where the Payments Approach, 
even with a small weight, can perturb the overall CPI by implausibly 
large amounts.  
 
The Irish CPI measure of cost for owner-occupied housing is 
based on a combination of current and historical house price index 
numbers as well as current mortgage interest costs. The impact of 
the CSO’s treatment of owner-occupied housing costs on the 
overall monthly CPI reading has recently become quite noticeable, 
and has been highlighted by White (2005). This paper argues that 
the measure employed by the CSO is arbitrary, and not widely 
employed internationally; is not consistent with the interpretation of 
the Irish CPI as a conventional fixed-weight Laspeyres index of 
goods and services prices; has materially overstated Irish inflation in 
recent quarters; imparts a cyclical component (which can be positive 
or negative) to the CPI which mirrors the interest rate cycle; and 
finally would continue to generate monthly CPI increases far into 
the future, even if all constituent prices, including not just goods 
and services prices but also house prices and interest rates, were to 
stabilise at current levels.  
 
 Table 1 shows the weights for each of the twelve categories of 
goods and services distinguished in the current (base December 
2006) Irish All-Items CPI. Category 4 is broken down into two 
components, 4a which includes rents paid on the portion of the 
housing stock rented privately or from local authorities, and 4b, 
called ‘mortgage interest’. This category 4b is the CSO’s vehicle for 
including in the CPI some recognition of the fact that almost 80 per 
cent of the Irish housing stock is occupied by its owners. The CSO 
2. 
Treatment of 
Owner-
Occupied 
Housing in the 
Irish CPI 
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 calculates each month a weighted average interest rate based on 
returns from the principal mortgage lenders. This is applied to an 
estimate of the average mortgage debt outstanding, and finally the 
weight, updated every five years from the Household Budget 
Survey, of .0666 is applied. Item 4b, Mortgage Interest, rose 48 per 
cent in the twelve months to January 2007. 
Table 1: Base Weights and Index Levels at January 2007, Irish All-
Items CPI 
    
  Weight % 12-Month % 
Change 
  1. Food, Non-Alcoholic Beverages 11.74 1.8 
  2. Alcoholic Beverages, Tobacco 6.05 5.5 
  3. Clothing and Footwear 5.42 -1.5 
  4a. Rents, Water, Electricity, Gas, Fuels 9.85 6.8 
  4b. Mortgage Interest 6.66 47.9 
  5. Furniture, Household Equipment, 
Maintenance 
4.42 -0.9 
  6. Health 3.15 3.4 
  7. Transport 13.29 1.2 
  8. Communications 3.42 -0.2 
  9. Recreation, Culture 10.10 2.2  
10. Education 2.04 4.9 
11. Restaurants and Hotels 15.42 4.4 
12. Miscellaneous 8.42 1.6 
 Total 100.00 5.2 
    
Source: CSO. 
 
The component corresponding to category 4b which goes into 
the All-Items CPI is  
 
Item 4b = .0666 x (Mortgage Debt Outstanding) x (Mortgage 
Interest Rate) (1) 
 
This treatment can be thought of as defining the average 
mortgage debt as a ‘good’, and the interest rate as its price. The 
average mortgage debt outstanding is measured as a distributed lag 
on house prices going back 240 months (20 years). The All-Items 
Irish CPI can thus be expressed as the sum of a contemporaneous 
fixed-weight Laspeyres goods-and-services index with weight 
roughly 93.3 per cent and a component which is the product of a 
weight, a current interest rate term and a distributed lag on historical 
house prices. Thus  
 
 Cit.  = .9333 Lt + .0666 ∑wt-iHt-iRt, i = 0 to 239,  (2) 
 
where 
 
Lt = a fixed-weight (Laspeyres) index of contemporaneous goods 
and services prices, other than the services of the stock of owner-
occupied housing, 
 
wt-i = declining weights reflecting interest component of the annuity 
formula, assuming a 20-year variable rate mortgage, 
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 Ht-i =  a national index of house prices for month t-i, 
 
Rt  =  contemporaneous average of the variable mortgage rate   
 
The index thus has a memory, and the potential to vary even if 
contemporaneous prices (including house prices and the interest 
rate) do not. In effect, the quantity term is not fixed, unless house 
prices have been constant. To this extent, the Irish All-Items CPI is 
not a conventional ‘snapshot’ Laspeyres price index as commonly 
understood. It contains lagged quantity terms. The mortgage debt 
outstanding is computed as a sum, going back 240 months (20 
years), of the historical index of house prices multiplied by the 
portion of the principal which remains outstanding under the 
annuity mortgage formula.  
 
Thus mortgages from 20 years ago have a small weight for two 
reasons. House prices were much lower twenty years ago, and in 
addition, very little of the principal will still be outstanding. Each 
month, a fresh observation, corresponding to today’s house price 
index and with the full loan amount outstanding, is added to the 
sum, while the oldest observation, corresponding to a much lower 
house price (national average house price is currently over five times 
the level of twenty years earlier) and with a tiny portion still 
outstanding, is deleted. Thus the amount of mortgage debt 
outstanding will, after a period of house price growth, have strong 
upward momentum and will impart this to the overall CPI. The 
CSO acknowledge that this happens even if interest rates do not 
rise. Eventually though the impact of a once-off jump in house 
prices peters out, since the weights attaching to the house price term 
decline fairly quickly, and ultimately to zero after twenty years. The 
scheme used by CSO at present assigns just under 50 per cent of 
total weight to the most recent five years, and almost 90 per cent to 
the most recent ten years.4 The potential for this formula to add 
upward momentum to the CPI is offset when mortgage interest 
rates are declining, but can be significant even at constant interest 
rates. But if both house prices and mortgage interest rates are rising, 
as has been the case through 2006 and into 2007, the CSO 
methodology will add substantially to the overall measure of CPI 
inflation. 
 
The All-Items CPI rose 5.2 per cent in the twelve months to 
January 2007. If the single item 4b were excluded from the CPI 
calculation for the twelve months to January last, the increase would 
have been 2.7 per cent. That is to say, the category 4b, despite its 
small weight, has almost doubled the CPI measure over the period. 
This bias, if bias is the right way to describe it, is additional to the 
estimates of substitution and other biases commonly reported for 
fixed-weight CPIs. Bias from these sources of about 1.1 per cent 
 
4 The author would like to thank CSO for making their detailed unpublished 
workings available. 
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 was computed in the report of the Boskin Commission on the US 
CPI  (Boskin, 1996) and there have been estimates in the 1 per cent 
zone in similar studies for other countries. Of course, the bias to the 
Irish index from the mortgage interest item is likely to be episodic. 
With house prices flat and interest rates falling, it would be negative, 
that is, it would reduce the CPI reading below that given by a 
conventional Laspeyres index. The net impact of the two 
components could also be small or even zero for long periods, as 
seems to have happened from 2001 to 2005, as the house price and 
interest rate components moved in opposite directions. But the 
recent experience in Ireland shows that, when a bias does emerge, it 
can be substantial, even with a weight below 7 per cent in the 
overall CPI. It should be noted that the December 2006 weights 
revision saw the 4b item rise from 4.6 per cent to 6.7 per cent, so 
whatever distortion is being created has been magnified by the 
revision. Figure 1 plots index estimates with and without the 
mortgage interest item 4b. 
Figure 1: The CPI Since 2000, With and Without Mortgage Interest 
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The recent acceleration in the All-Items index is clear from the 
chart. The twelve-month rates of increase in both indices to January 
each year are shown in the next table. 
 
Table 2: Twelve-Month CPI Inflation, With and Without Mortgage 
Interest  
    
Twelve Months to All-Items CPI CPI ex 
Mortgages 
Mortgage 
Impact 
January 2001 5.2 4.1 +1.1 
January 2002 5.0 5.5 -0.5 
January 2003 4.7 5.1 -0.4 
January 2004 1.8 2.0 -0.2 
January 2005 2.3 1.9 +0.4 
January 2006 2.9 2.2 +0.7 
January 2007 5.2 2.7 +2.5 
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 Note the negative contribution of the mortgage item during the 
2001 to 2003 period, when ECB rates were declining, and the sharp 
upward impact during 2006. The pattern evident in the monthly 
figures for the early months of 2007, as rates continued to rise, 
suggests that the impact of the mortgage item in the twelve months 
to January 2008 will again be substantial, and the All-Items index 
could exceed the ex-mortgages index by as much as it did during 
2007.  
 
The divergences in inflation rates as measured by the HICPs of 
the Eurozone member-countries (which exclude housing altogether) 
have been extensively studied. Ireland’s ‘excess’ inflation relative to 
the Eurozone (see Honohan and Lane (2003) has been notable, and 
a feedback loop through informal indexation to an upward-biased 
CPI is a possible explanatory factor. 
 
 The CSO methodology in regard to the treatment of mortgage 
interest (category 4b) is to include in the Consumer Price Index an 
item which is the product of a distributed lag on house prices, the 
declining weights reflecting the annuity mortgage process, 
multiplied by a contemporaneous interest rate term. Before 
considering the issues raised by this approach, it is interesting to 
consider what would happen to the Irish index, with current 
(December 2006) weights, if all prices of goods and services, as well 
as house prices and the mortgage interest rate, were to be frozen at 
the current level. Conceding the CSO’s point that the CPI is not 
intended as a cost-of-living index, it is fair to ask to what degree it 
behaves like a conventional Laspeyres price index, which is a 
(monthly) snapshot of goods and services prices with no internal 
dynamics. The conventional Laspeyres index is a straightforward 
product of fixed weights and (possibly) varying, but 
contemporaneous, prices. If prices are unvarying, a Laspeyres index 
should be constant, since the only other component is the fixed 
weights. But even with fixed prices, the Irish CPI would, given the 
history of house prices, continue to rise, and at a significant rate, for 
many years into the future. 
3. 
Projecting the 
Future Path of 
the CPI 
Table 3: Future Path of the CPI with Constant Prices and Interest 
Rates 
   
January of Level of Item 4b Level of All-Items CPI  
2007 100.0 100.00 
2008 110.2 100.67 
2009 119.1 101.27 
2010 126.8 101.78 
2011 133.3 102.21 
2012 138.7 102.57 
2013 143.2 102.87 
2014 146.7 103.10 
2015 149.5 103.29 
2016 151.7 103.44 
2017 153.4 103.55 
   
2027 157.4 103.82 
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 The ultimate increase can easily be calculated. First fix the 
interest rate at today’s figure. If the January 2007 house price is set 
at the current level for twenty years and the CSO’s distributed-lag 
weights applied, the result is that the sub-index corresponding to 4b 
eventually rises by 57.4 per cent. Applying the 4b weight in the 
overall CPI brings the All-Items index up from 100 to 103.82 after 
twenty years, at which point it increases no further. Thus on average 
over the twenty years, the CPI rises by roughly 0.2 per cent per 
annum for no apparent reason: neither goods-and-services prices, 
house prices, nor the interest rate, have moved. 
 
Moreover this effect is heavily front-loaded. The precise pattern 
depends on the actual history of house prices, but on the prevailing 
Irish data, will add 0.67 per cent in the first year, declining to about 
0.2 per cent after eight years and dwindling away to very small 
amounts as the twenty-year horizon is approached. This is of course 
a reflection of the house price boom over the last decade.  
 
Over the full 20-year period, the overall CPI rises 3.8 per cent, 
even though no price of a good or service has risen, and neither 
have house prices or interest rates. The magnitudes of the low 20-
year-old house price numbers (weighted by the small amounts still 
outstanding under the annuity formula) which are being dropped 
from the calculation eventually catch up with the higher (and 
constant, by assumption) current numbers being added, and the 
process peters out. But in the early years, the CPI is biased upwards 
by more than half of a percentage point. The effect falls below one-
tenth of a percentage point per annum only after eleven years. It 
should be noted that the Irish CSO re-bases the CPI every five 
years, so in reality the weights would not be unaltered for a twenty-
year period. But they will be unaltered for the five years up to 
December 2011, and the main action is concentrated in this period.5  
 
Over the twelve months of 2007, if there is no change to any 
price of a good or service, no change to house prices, and no 
change to mortgage interest rates, the All-Items Irish CPI will rise 
by about 0.67 per cent on these calculations. A conventional 
Laspeyres index would, of course, show no increase at all in these 
circumstances, nor would the Eurostat HICP for Ireland, which is a 
conventional Laspeyres index.  
 
There is an additional problem. The current trend in interest 
rates is upwards, and the European Central Bank has been imposing 
quarter-point increases at three-month intervals. Should the ECB 
base rate increase by 1 per cent in the twelve months to January 
2008, as appears likely at time of writing, this factor would raise the 
typical mortgage rate from about 4.50 per cent to about 5.50 per 
cent, and would add 1.48 points to the CPI, other things equal. 
 
5 Index re-basing produces chain-linked indices and can introduce other biases, see 
Oulton (2007). 
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 Added to the impact of house price history, the All-Items CPI 
seems set to rise by at least 2 per cent more over 2007 than the CPI 
excluding mortgage interest. Thus in the short term, the interest rate 
oscillations are adding more than the ‘memory’ effect, but it is 
reasonable to expect that, in the absence of a long-run secular trend 
in interest rates, they will reverse within a year or two. The 
‘memory’ effect, though smaller, is more persistent (a twenty-year 
distributed lag), and would need a protracted house price bust to 
reverse itself. 
 
There is an asymmetry in the treatment of house prices and 
interest rates in the CSO’s deployment of the Payments Approach: 
house price impacts are damped very heavily, but current interest 
rates enter with a bang. It should be clear that if house prices 
doubled in the next month, there would be a tiny impact on next 
month’s index. While the contemporaneous weight under the 
annuity formula is the largest, it accounts for only 1/85th. of the 
total of the 240 weights. Thus if house prices doubled, the CPI 
impact in month 1 would be under one-tenth of a percentage point. 
It would take twenty years for the full impact to emerge. The 
immediate impact of just a quarter-point increase in the current 
interest rate would be about four times greater. The Payments 
Approach does eventually take the full increase on board, but does 
so very slowly, in contrast to the Acquisitions Approach, which 
(with no role for interest rates) transmits the full house price change 
contemporaneously.  
 
If the mortgage rate were to increase from 4.5 per cent to 4.75 
per cent, the 4b sub-index goes up immediately by 5.56 per cent and 
the overall CPI by 0.36 per cent, all other things equal. The same 
would happen on the way down, of course, so the CSO 
methodology imparts a cyclical component, related to ECB policy, 
to the Irish Consumer Price Index. Should there prove to be a long-
term cycle in ECB interest rates, the cyclical pattern will be 
transmitted to the All-Items CPI. If ECB base rates cycle between 
say 2 per cent and 5 per cent (the lowest recorded to date has been 
2 per cent, the highest 4.75 per cent, versus current June 2007 rate 
of 4 per cent), retail mortgage rates would oscillate between about 3 
per cent and about 6 per cent, and the All-Items CPI would put on 
6.67 per cent in total during the upswing years due to this factor 
alone, and lose it all again through the downswing. Some evidence 
of this kind of pattern (compounded with the upward momentum 
from house price history) is clear from the final column in Table 2.   
 
Any Laspeyres index is likely to contain an upward bias for 
various well-known reasons: the Irish CPI is biased upward compared 
to a conventional Laspeyres index, given the recent history of house 
prices. The bias is substantial. In addition, the swings in interest 
rates contribute a cyclical component, currently upwards. The 
combination of the two is creating an impression of a rapid recent 
inflation in consumer prices, some of which is due to a real 
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 underlying up-tick in goods and services prices, but most of it is due 
to a methodology for dealing with the costs of owner-occupancy 
which is not widely used internationally. The methodology is bound 
to produce this type of pattern given a recent house price boom, 
even if that boom is over, and given a cyclical upswing in interest 
rates, even if that upswing is likely to reverse itself in due course. 
 
 If the use of the Payments Approach made only a small difference 
as compared to alternatives, and bearing in mind that there are 
numerous other unavoidable sources of approximation in compiling 
a monthly price index, the choice of methodology for dealing with 
owner-occupied housing would be a minor matter. The principal 
practical problem created by the Irish CSO’s use of the Payments 
Approach derives from two sources. The first, as is clear from the 
recent history of the index, is that it makes a considerable 
difference, despite the apparently small weight. The second is that 
the Irish CPI is routinely treated as if it were a cost of living index, 
and is invariably referred to in these terms in the media coverage of 
the monthly data release, notwithstanding the CSO’s insistence that 
it is not designed to measure the cost of living. As a result CPI 
readings are regularly invoked (at least when they are trending 
upwards) by those seeking increases in wages and in transfer 
payments.  
4. 
Discussion and 
Options for 
Index Revision 
 
The twelve-month changes in the index rose substantially during 
the national pay talks in early 2006, and a further up-tick in the 
index through late 2006 and early 2007 has already stimulated 
demands for a revision of the agreement. While there is virtually no 
automatic indexation to the CPI (or to any other index) in the Irish 
public finance arrangements, given the highly centralised system of 
pay negotiation in the public sector and the tendency to take 
cognisance of the CPI in decisions on rates of transfer payments, 
the potential impetus to public spending growth is clear. Almost 
two-thirds of Irish gross current public spending consists of transfer 
payments or public service pay and pensions. The total of the two 
will be about €35 billion in 2007, so over- or under-indexation 
involves substantial amounts. 
 
In their May 2003 methodology note, the CSO observe that the 
Payments Approach is used in three countries, Australia, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom. As it happens, the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics abandoned the Payments Approach following a CPI 
review in 1997, and they moved to an acquisitions basis (Woolford, 
2005). The position in OECD countries is shown in the table.  
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 Table 4: OECD Countries’ CPI Treatment of Owner-Occupied 
Housing, 2002 
   
Method No. of 
Countries 
List of Countries 
Rental Equivalent 13 Mexico, USA, Japan, Korea, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Germany, Hungary,  
Netherlands, Norway,  
Slovakia, 
Switzerland, Turkey  
 
User Cost 5 Canada, Finland, Iceland, 
Sweden, United Kingdom 
 
Net Acquisitions 2 Australia, New Zealand 
 
Payments 2 Ireland, United Kingdom 
 
Excluded Entirely 9 Belgium, France, Greece, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Eurozone 
(HICP) 
   
 
The United Kingdom, in its Retail Price Index, appears to be the 
only other OECD country still producing an index using the 
Payments Approach. It also produces an index using a User Cost 
method, and of course all EU (not just Eurozone) countries 
produce national versions of the HICP, which excludes owner-
occupied housing altogether. Interestingly the UK, like Ireland, has 
recently had a house price boom and is in the upswing of the 
interest rate cycle. The most recent (May 2007) 12-month reading 
for its RPI is 4.3 per cent, well ahead of the UK variant of the 
HICP, which was at 2.5 per cent, the same pattern observable in 
Ireland. 
 
The CSO’s implementation of the Payments Approach in 
compiling the monthly CPI is not at issue: the method used by the 
Office of National Statistics in the United Kingdom for the RPI is 
similar, as was the pre-1997 Australian procedure. If the logic of 
treating debt outstanding as a good and the interest rate as its price 
is accepted, then the Irish CSO’s calculations successfully 
implement this procedure. The problem is conceptual: the Payments 
Approach introduces a cuckoo into the CPI nest, which, while a 
small cuckoo, behaves disruptively after a house price boom, and 
during periods of interest rate volatility, precisely the conditions 
which currently obtain in Ireland. If house prices always rose at the 
inflation rate of goods and services, and interest rates were stable, 
the Payments Approach, as is clear with a little manipulation of 
Equation (2), would not impact the CPI at all. Indeed, over very 
long periods (say a decade and upwards), one would expect the 
Payments Approach to equate to the other approaches, since 
interest rate cycles should wash out, rent/value ratios will tend to 
revert to the mean and exceptional house price booms tend to be 
followed by house price busts according to Kelly (2007). The 
problem is that the CPI comes out every month, and is intended to 
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 give a reliable short-run read on what is happening to goods and 
services prices.  
 
Following the adoption of explicit inflation targets by central 
banks around the world over the last decade, there has been 
extensive professional discussion of price index construction, and in 
particular of the alternatives in dealing with owner-occupied 
housing costs. The verdicts on the Payments Approach have been 
uniformly negative, and this extended quote from Goodhart (2001) 
is representative: 
 
The second main approach is the payments approach, 
measuring actual cash outflows, on down payments, mortgage 
repayments and mortgage interest, or some subset of the above. 
This approach always, however, includes mortgage interest 
payments. This, though common, is analytically unsound. First, 
the procedure is not carried out consistently across purchases. 
Other goods bought on the basis of credit, e.g., credit card credit, 
are usually not treated as more expensive on that account (though 
they have been in New Zealand). Second, the treatment of interest 
flows is not consistent across persons. If a borrower is worse off 
in some sense when interest rates rise, then equivalently a lender 
owning an interest bearing asset is better off; why measure one 
and not the other? If I sell an interest earning asset, say a money 
market mutual fund holding, to buy a house, why am I treated 
differently to someone who borrows on a (variable rate) 
mortgage? Third, should not the question of the price of any 
purchase be assessed separately from the issue of how that might 
be financed? Imports, inventories and all business purchases tend 
to be purchased in part on credit. Should we regard imports as 
more expensive, when the cost of trade credit rises? Money, 
moreover, is fungible. As we know from calculation of mortgage 
equity withdrawal, the loan may be secured on the house but used 
to pay for furniture. When interest rates rise, is the furniture 
thereby more expensive? Moreover, the actual cash out-payments 
totally ignore changes in the on going value of the house whether 
by depreciation, or capital loss/gain, which will often dwarf the 
cash flow.    
 
Diewert (2002) writes: “I agree with Goodhart in being critical 
of this approach. My main objection to the approach is that it 
ignores the opportunity costs of holding the equity in the owner-
occupied dwelling and it ignores depreciation”.  
 
Most people have mortgages outstanding which are small 
relative to the price of their homes: the value of the housing stock is 
somewhere between four and five times the level of residential 
mortgage debt outstanding. Why should income recipients be 
compensated for an increase in the cost of credit, ignoring the fact 
that there are two sides to the household sector’s balance sheet? The 
impact of interest rate changes on household income (not that this 
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 is what the CPI is supposed to measure) would be more than halved 
when the banks’ liabilities to the household sector are factored in. 
Where pay increases are formally or informally linked to a CPI, the 
impact of interest rate tightening will be offset where the CPI 
includes an interest rate term. If the European Central Bank were to 
use an index similar to the Irish CPI, it is arguable that interest rate 
changes would have to be larger, to offset the wage-indexation 
effect. Not surprisingly, central banks object to the inclusion of 
interest rate terms in the target price index used in setting interest 
rates, and the UK’s monetary policy target has excluded an interest 
component from its inception, employing initially RPI-X, the Retail 
Price Index with mortgages excluded, and more recently the UK 
version of the HICP, which also excludes them.  
 
The likelihood is that the European HICP revision will, if 
agreement can be reached at all, opt for an Acquisitions Approach 
but the question remains as to what should be done with the Irish 
CPI, which is the most familiar of all Irish price indices to the 
general public, and features widely in formal and informal 
indexation contracts and agreements. Some Irish sector regulators 
use the CPI to reference the price-caps which they administer, and 
also to compute current valuations of the regulated asset base of the 
firms they regulate. Some bond-issuers specify the CPI in 
indexation formulae. At minimum, the Irish HICP would be an 
improvement for these purposes.  
 
A better reform, and one which could be undertaken without 
formally shifting from a COGI to a COLI framework, would be to 
attempt an implementation of the Rental Equivalence approach, 
which is already deployed by the Irish CSO in the national accounts 
and is the methodology stipulated in the United Nations 1993 SNA 
(System of National Accounts). The necessary private rental index 
already exists, although it is acknowledged that producing a suitable 
monthly (and quality-adjusted) rental index would be significant 
extra work-load in the construction of a revised CPI. The flow of 
services from the housing stock is the item which belongs in an 
index of the cost of consumption, and the Rental Equivalence 
approach, the most popular in OECD countries, seeks to price this 
item directly through a rental index. A paper addressing the 
problems involved in implementing the rental equivalence approach 
in Spain is Arevalo and Ruiz-Castillo (2004).  
 
Statisticians tend to be more partial to the COGI than to the 
COLI approach, which is more popular with economists, see 
Triplett (2001). The weaknesses of the Payments Approach 
however have nothing to do with this debate. The Payments 
Approach yields an index which introduces arbitrary distortions not 
present with alternative COGI methodologies for incorporating 
owner-occupied housing.   
   
 96
 But since the CPI continues to be treated by the public and the 
media as a cost of living index, notwithstanding the CSO’s 
reasonable insistence that it is not, perhaps it is time to consider 
replacing it with an index which measures what everyone seems to 
think it measures. The CSO has already made some moves in this 
direction through the introduction of new goods for old, and in the 
regular introduction of new outlets, measures which should 
diminish the bias in a COGI relative to a COLI. In the meantime, 
the Irish variant of the HICP is a more reliable indicator of 
underlying goods-and-services inflation, although it doubtless 
remains prone to the upward biases common to any Laspeyres-type 
index.   
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